
JULY 1, 2024
NEWS
TOP
ANALYSIS
THE 5Ds OF CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS IN JAPAN
Most energy discussions center on the supply or demand of electricity or molecules. Yet without the critical raw materials (CRMs) to build power supply generation facilities, the planning of future energy systems is moot. Japan is a net importer of most critical minerals used in clean energy technologies. Japan’s self-sufficiency in key critical resources is slipping. If Japan fails to secure access to CRMs, then it might also need to adjust its energy strategies.
COPPER SHORTAGES LOOM: DEMAND-SIDE MEASURES ARE NEEDED
Copper means a lot to Japan, which has a total copper refining capacity of 1.7 million tons/ year, the world’s second largest after China. The main concern is surging demand, driven by diversified power transmission networks, as well as a surge in AI-driven data traffic. In June, ANRE decided to drive more investments into overseas copper mines by increasing state ownership of future projects. Also, it launched efforts to encourage new businesses in the metal recycling industry. Can other measures, especially on the demand side, be implemented to help manage possible shortages?
ASIA ENERGY VIEW
A wrap of top energy news that impacts other Asian countries.
EVENTS SCHEDULE
A selection of events to keep an eye on in 2024.
PUBLISHER
K. K. Yuri Group
Editorial Team
Yuriy Humber (Editor-in-Chief)
John Varoli (Senior Editor, Americas)
Mayumi Watanabe (Japan)
Kyoko Fukuda (Japan)
Magdalena Osumi (Japan
Filippo Pedretti (Japan)
Tim Young (Japan)
Regular Contributors
Chisaki Watanabe (Japan)
Takehiro Masutomo (Japan)
Events
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OFTEN-USED ACRONYMS
|
METI |
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry |
mmbtu |
Million British Thermal Units | |
|
MoE |
Ministry of Environment |
mb/d |
Million barrels per day | |
|
ANRE |
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy |
mtoe |
Million Tons of Oil Equivalent | |
|
NEDO |
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization |
kWh |
Kilowatt hours (electricity generation volume) | |
|
TEPCO |
Tokyo Electric Power Company |
FIT |
Feed-in Tariff | |
|
KEPCO |
Kansai Electric Power Company |
FIP |
Feed-in Premium | |
|
EPCO |
Electric Power Company |
SAF |
Sustainable Aviation Fuel | |
|
JCC |
Japan Crude Cocktail |
NPP |
Nuclear power plant | |
|
JKM |
Japan Korea Market, the Platt’s LNG benchmark |
JOGMEC |
Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security | |
|
CCUS |
Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage | |||
|
OCCTO |
Organization for Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators | |||
|
NRA |
Nuclear Regulation Authority | |||
|
GX |
Green Transformation |

METI eyes 5 GW capacity for long-term decarbonized power source auction in early 2025
(Japan NRG, Government statement, June 28)
TAKEAWAY: The review will likely take a while and seek to gather opinions from market participants before finalizing the criteria for Round 2. METI has been encouraged by the strong BESS showing, but also wants LTDA to support a wide range of generation sources, including hydro, nuclear, as well as a revamp of thermal generation via ammonia co-firing and similar.
METI to support nine CCS projects for commercialization by 2030
(Government statement, June 28)
Cost levels of combined energy sources will be a focus of the 7th Basic Energy Plan
(Denki Shimbun, June 24)
PM Kishida vows to restart subsidies for electricity and gas, drawing criticism
(Denki Shimbun, June 25)
TAKEAWAY: Kishida’s move has also drawn backlash from utilities; as they suspect the resumption is a political ploy ahead of the LDP leadership race in September.
The reliability of publishing a regional reserve margin data to be reviewed by ANRE
(Denki Shimbun, June 25)
Govt mulls settling power supply startup cost ex-post to aid balancing market
(Denki Shimbun, June 26)
JOGMEC and BVJ sign MoC for improved efficiency of offshore wind projects
(Organization statement, June 25)
TAKEAWAY: As Japan seeks to build almost 10 GW of offshore wind power by late FY2030, speeding up project development is crucial. Developers rely on the Centralized System that reflects the criteria set by the government. This MoC with BVJ reflects concerns over the accuracy and accessibility of the government approved data.
In Q1 2025, Mitsubishi Power will launch ACES Delta, a green hydrogen facility in the U.S.
(Japan NRG, June 26)
Toho Gas launches 1.7 ton daily hydrogen production in Aichi Pref
(Company statement, June 27)
TAKEAWAY: The Alhytec system produces 27 kg of hydrogen per hour from 270 kg of aluminum hydroxide; not a large amount. However, the capacity to output low-cost small-volume hydrogen from household materials could develop into interesting markets. For example, tech startup Gita is developing hydrogen-fueled kickboards and bicycles, using metal hydride as a hydrogen carrier to improve safety. There are also studies to use methanol as a carrier of hydrogen for small off-grid power systems.
Sumitomo Electric develops electrodes for green hydrogen electrolyzers
(Nikkei, June 28)
TAKEAWAY: Power consumption is an important green hydrogen cost factor, along with the endurance of the electrodes, the cost of manufacturing the electrodes, etc.
JBIC to provide loan to UAE ammonia project
(JBIC statement, June 25)
TAKEAWAY: JBIC’s key role is to support industries in developing economies, but in 2022 its scope expanded to financing ammonia projects in industrialized economies.
Itochu to build supply chain for steel with low carbon footprint
(Nikkei Asia, June 23)
TAKEAWAY: The success of DRI supply chains depend on access to high-grade iron ore with over 92% iron content, because lower-grade ores are not suitable for the process. Itochu owns stakes in Brazilian and Canadian mines with DRI-grade iron ore deposits. Sumitomo Corp also owns DRI-grade iron ore assets in Brazil and could build a similar supply chain.
Solar car cuts 80 kg of CO2 per year: study
(Japan NRG, June 26)
TAKEAWAY: Murakami & Co plan to commercialize solar-car services in 2025. The study shows consumer behavior must change to make use of zero-emission cars. A company official told Japan NRG that the most difficult change has been promoting the habit of parking the cars outside the garage for solar power generation.

Hedge fund Citadel enters Japan’s power market, acquiring market maker Energy Grid
(Japan NRG, June 28)
TAKEAWAY: The Japanese stock market is seeing more foreign investors pushing for corporate governance changes. Citadel’s entry into the Japanese market could encourage other overseas investors to follow suit.
JERA completes 20% ammonia co-firing test at Hekinan coal power station
(Company statement, June 26)
TAKEAWAY: JERA did not elaborate on the actual NOx and N2O release levels, but more disclosure will be required if offset credits are to be issued for ammonia co-firing.
Nanyo power plant to switch to ammonia co-firing, budgeted ¥6 billion for CCUS
(Chugoku Shimbun, June 21)
TAKEAWAY: The Shunan ammonia project may be one of Japan’s most cost-efficient since most of the capital-intensive infrastructure is already in place. The port is big enough for ammonia imports and a LPG pipeline already connects the three company plants with Idemitsu. Provided the LPG pipelines satisfy ammonia safety requirements, users only need to install ammonia burners and other facilities for co-firing.
JERA announced measures for electricity supply and demand during summer
(Company statement, June 27)
Bids continue downward in OCCTO’s first solar power auction in FY2024
(Government statement, June 21)
TAKEAWAY: The auction is another example of the trend among large companies to use the tender as a way to secure grid connectivity while securing better price deals under PPAs or other contracts. The biggest winner in the previous auction, the last in FY2023, offered ¥0/ kWh. Auctions held in the past few years showed a tendency for operators to bid below ¥7/ kWh, which many say is not a feasible level at which to run a solar power plant.
OCCTO requests TEPCO Power Grid to support Tohoku again with power transfer
(Denki Shimbun, June 25)
Spot market: Supply-demand balance eases in May despite thermal power outage
(Japan NRG, June 26)
J-Power announces sale of stake in Green Country Energy in the U.S.
(Company statement, June 28)
IHI and EGAT ink MoU for biomass co-firing at Thailand power plant
(Company statement, June 26)
Kyushu Electric to explore pumped storage power generation at existing dams
(Denki Shimbun, June 26)
Nikkei surveys Japanese executives about NPP restarts, finds strong support
(Nikkei, June 25)
Oi NPP Units 3-4 approved for long-term facility management plan
(Company statement, June 26)

Mitsui acquires unconventional gas asset in Texas from U.S. energy companies
(Company statement, June 24)
Canada’s Lundin inks deal with JX Metals to boosts stake in Chile copper mine
(Company statement, June 26)
TAKEAWAY: The mine also had reserves of molybdenum, which at the time was positioned to what lithium or nickel are today, critical to the economy. However, the mine’s drawback was its remote location that inflated the costs of bringing ores to Japan.
Chiyoda appeals to U.S. court to resume work on large LNG project in Texas
(Nikkei, June 27)
NYK and Pertamina sign MoU on LCO2 and LNG transportation
(Company statement, June 26)
TAKEAWAY: LCO2 carriers are emerging worldwide to service the CCS industry. They’re smaller than LNG tankers thanks to pressure chamber constraints. Their goal is to transport CO2 from emitters to storage sites. However, there’s currently a shortage of port infrastructure. While such carriers are expected to increase in number, issues remain with shipping costs and logistics.
LNG stocks down 2.8% from previous week
(Government data, June 26)
BY PROFESSOR ANDREW DeWIT
The 5Ds of Critical Raw Materials in Japan
On June 7, the energy agency (ANRE) made a startling admission about Japan’s vulnerability in critical raw materials. A mere three years after trumpeting a heightened focus on boosting the nation’s self-sufficiency in the materials needed to decarbonize energy systems, the agency quietly confessed that the goals were unreachable.
Most energy discussions center on the supply or demand of electricity or molecules, as well as the associated costs. Yet without the critical raw materials (CRMs) to build power supply generation facilities, the planning of future energy systems is moot. Japan is a net importer of most CRMs used in batteries and EVs, solar and wind generation equipment, and other clean energy technologies.
ANRE’s admission comes at an important juncture. Deliberations over an update to the national Basic Energy Plan are ongoing, and influential policy experts, such as those at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ), argue that CRM security should be made equivalent to national security. An extension of this logic suggests that if Japan fails to secure adequate access to certain CRMs, then it might also need to adjust its energy strategies.
Japanese diplomats and businesses have been active in securing the supply of CRMs, striking deals with the U.S. and EU to collaborate on development and procurement. Also, the state resource company JOGMEC has had its remit expanded from hydrocarbons to CRMs.
Data from ANRE, however, suggests that the above activity has yet to bear fruit. Meanwhile, Japan’s self-sufficiency in key critical resources is slipping.
Copper shock
ANRE published its recent concerns in a document titled “Future directions in mineral resource policy,” noting that Japan’s current energy strategy aims for an 80% self-sufficiency in copper and other base metals largely via Japan’s offtake from collaborative overseas projects. By 2050, that ratio is supposed to hit 100%.
But a mere three years after Japanese officials announced the above targets, ANRE’s data show that Japan’s self-sufficiency in copper has in fact plummeted from about 58% in 2014 to around 40% in 2022. Recent initiatives are expected to bolster the ratio to roughly 48% in 2023, and then help it head for a likely peak of about 54% in 2030. But after that, it is projected to decline to under 40% in 2040.
Japan’s oft-cited policy goals in copper and other CRMs are thus questionable, leaving Japan more vulnerable to supply shocks and other risks. Japan is over-invested in regions with depleting mines, and ill-equipped to assess the full slate of factors driving demand and then respond adroitly.
ANRE clearly understands these core facts. Even so, it seems that the agency isn’t yet sufficiently apprehensive because it underplays or overlooks several huge drivers of CRM insecurity. This does not refer, however, to the high dependence on Chinese-dominated supply chains, even though IEA and Japanese data show that the dependence has worsened over the past few years.
Dependence on China is quite problematic, but there’s already extensive literature on that. Rather, below is an overview of Japan’s dire critical mineral challenges as the 5Ds of decarbonization, digitalization, defense, demographics, and debt.
Decarbonization: Japan’s official decarbonization goals include nearly halving emissions between 2103 and 2030, and then achieving net zero by 2050. As with other developed countries, Japan’s climate goals imply a major increase in CRM demand to build a vast new infrastructure of clean generation, transmission, storage, and end-use electrification. For example, Japan plans to raise solar, wind and other renewable energy shares in its power mix, from 21.7% in 2022 to between 36-38% by 2030, and even more in subsequent years. Also, their intermittency will be addressed with battery storage and expansion of the transmission grid.
Missing from these and other energy-transition ambitions is a Japan-specific assessment of how much copper, silver, nickel, rare earths and other CRMs are likely to be required. JOGMEG and the IEEJ released a scoping study in 2022, but they used IEA and other global macro level data to project material demand from EVs, solar, wind, and other technologies. Yet decarbonization in Japan will almost certainly require a much higher density of CRMs per unit of emissions reduction/clean energy than the global average, especially if Japan’s decarbonization is centered on distributed solar and offshore wind.
Japan’s high CRM density of decarbonization is not merely driven by the country’s need for a multi-trillion yen expansion of copper-intensive cables to link distant offshore wind generation with urban power consumption centers. Beyond copper, cobalt, rare earths, and other much-discussed CRMs, many other materials matter. For example, BloombergNEF estimates that silver use in solar is roughly 12 tons/GW of capacity. Solar’s consumption of global silver production rose from 5% in 2014 to 14% in 2023, while silver’s cost per solar module has reached 11%, further squeezing manufacturers’ already strained profitability. And Figure 1 shows that solar’s demand for silver was up a startling 64% between 2022 and 2023, and that Japan’s consumption share declined by 1% while Chinese demand grew by 57%. China is willing to pay a double-digit premium for silver whereas Japanese producers struggle with a devaluing currency already at 50-year lows in purchasing power.
Silver demand in electrical and electronics

Source: Silver Institute
To be sure, Japan hopes to innovate low-cost and large-scale manufacturing of iodine-based perovskite solar by 2040. But that is decades away, and meanwhile, silver is also increasingly needed in EVs, chargers, and many other decarbonization-related technologies.
Digitalization: Digitalization ramps up demand for CRMs because data centers are material-intensive and require large increases in power generation to satisfy Chat GPT and other innovations’ voracious appetite for electricity. The ANRE document effectively concedes that policymakers overlooked digitalization when they formulated their self-sufficiency targets. In 2022, Japan’s total copper consumption was roughly 1 million tons, but by 2030 that’s projected to rise to well over 1.4 million tons.
A big share of the increase in copper owes to EVs along with renewables and power systems. But digitalization and AI are now expected to require a lot more, likely quintupling globally to 1 million tons by 2030. Drilling down on demand numbers, we find that most reliable estimates suggest each MW of data center power capacity requires between 20 to 40 tons of copper. Relatedly, one oft-cited new survey “Asia Pacific Data Center Trends” suggests that Japan will add 407 MW of new data center capacity between 2024 and 2026, a major increase over late 2023 total capacity of 892 MW.
Asia Pacific Data Center Trends, 2024-26

Source: CXOToday
Japan’s expansion of digitalization has a large CRM footprint on its own, and implies a lot of new (and ideally clean) power generation to operate those assets and ancillary infrastructure. The ANRE data indicate that Japan’s copper consumption for construction and other conventional uses will hover at about 800,000 tons/ year, reflecting its aging and shrinking society. And copper for conventional vehicles is slated to plunge from 200,000 tons/ year in 2022 to well under half that in 2030 and even less in 2040. Conversely, Japan’s 2 Ds of decarbonization and digitalization will add at least 500,000 tons/ year by 2030 and upwards of 600,000 tons by 2040.
Defense: Increasing expenditures on weapons systems and ammunition is another area of significant CRM demand. The authoritative “SIPRI Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023” reveals that global military spending grew 6.8% to an all-time high of $2.44 trillion. Various observers and institutions, including such diverse agencies as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Modern War Institute at West Point, are beginning to analyze the impact of rising military demand on geopolitically fraught CRM supply chains.
The ANRE document does not scope Japan’s military demand for copper, and indeed few analysts try to quantify defense demand for CRM. But highly regarded copper expert Simon Hunt’s firm, Simon Hunt Strategic Services, has estimated that defense demand consumed 9% of global copper in 2021 — 2.186 million metric tons — and was growing at 14% YoY. Meanwhile, Japan’s FY 2024 defense budget has risen to 1.6% of GDP or ¥8.9 trillion, rising at its fastest rate in 50 years.
Japan’s defense spend includes buying up or building a significant number of new fighter aircraft, warships, tanks, missiles, ammunition, and other CRM-intensive weapons systems. Given the scale of CRM in high-tech national defense, coupled with the rapid expansion of Japanese spending, the next iteration of ANRE’s work on mineral resources should include some numbers on defense demand.
Demographics: Japan’s shrinking and aging population is another 5D challenge for critical minerals. Ordinarily, Japan’s demographic shift would mean declining demand for copper and other CRM, as fewer and older citizens mean lower levels of per-capita consumption. But the potential for more compact and resource-efficient lifestyles is not reflected in the ANRE data that suggest a plateau, but not a decline, in annual copper demand outside of decarbonization and digitalization.
Japanese urban space has a high per-capita footprint of CRM in water, sanitation, transport, and other critical infrastructures. A more spatially compact urbanization has long been a policy goal of central agencies that govern infrastructure, urban planning, local finance and related areas.
Their policy goals would help moderate the rising costs of maintaining aging infrastructures, and help free up a lot of pipes, wires, and electric motors for recycling. But outside of a few communities, Japan’s demographic shift is marked by a startling increase in single-person households – from 20% in 1980 to 38% in 2020 – and the stubborn stickiness of cities’ and towns’ spatial extent.
Japan’s demographics have another challenging aspect. Since Japan doesn’t mine CRM domestically, it relies on its scarce human capital and networks to facilitate overseas projects. Even so, ANRE wants to expand Japan’s projects beyond reliance on the resource majors and conventional regions (eg, Latin America) to include a strong shift to working with junior mining firms in Africa and other frontier regions.
Moreover, ANRE hopes to bolster the intelligence-gathering capabilities of Japan’s JOGMEC and businesses involved in resource security. Yet the demographic challenge again becomes significant, as Japan already has a thin bench of talent capable of doing the work involved in securing CRM.
Moreover, those people are aging and on the cusp of retirement, while the academic institutions that should be training a lot of new recruits are in fact shrinking. ANRE urgently wants to foster many more skilled personnel capable of working in an increasingly dynamic and diverse environment, but that is a tall order for at least the next decade or two.
Debt: Perhaps the most forbidding of the 5Ds is Japan’s unmatched public debt, well over 260% of GDP and costing 22% of public spending in debt retirement even at ultra-low interest rates. ANRE and other agencies understand that increasing security in CRM will require a lot more public money, and in fact, recently increased JOGMEC’s capability to underwrite overseas initiatives.
More money is essential. The very high volatility of CRM prices has often left government-backed Chinese firms in the catbird seat, as their market-driven competitors were driven into bankruptcy and Chinese firms swooped in to buy up intellectual property and projects on the cheap. China has also built dominance in CRM mining and refining through decades of financing a comprehensive industrial policy of funding new technologies, training legions of experts, providing various carrots to foreign governments, and other strategies. Japan’s ANRE and others want to undertake that public-private approach.
But mining and refining projects are increasingly expensive, their costs driven up by local communities’ understandable desire for better returns, longer lead times, increased environmental rules, more costly water, and higher energy inputs in mining and processing declining ore grades. Finding a lot more public money in Japan confronts the probable increase in debt-finance payments coupled with the rising costs of social security, national defense, and myriad other areas. Worse yet, deep devaluation of the yen – if protracted – means that available funds buy far less in the way of overseas initiatives and offtake.
In summary, Japan’s CRM needs are expanding even as the daunting 5Ds of challenges complicate the country’s ability to secure adequate supplies. The existence of these constraints does not, of course, mean that decarbonization is impossible. Rather, the constraints suggest that many difficult tradeoffs will have to be made on the means of decarbonization and perhaps even the extent of digitalization.
Japan has perhaps been moving in this direction for some time. For example, Toyota credibly argues that decarbonizing mobility is better served by including a large role for CRM-lite hybrids rather than insisting on 100% CRM-intensive EVs. So to end on an optimistic note, the potential upside of Japan’s 5Ds could be a powerful return to the resource-efficiency that Japan once embodied.
BY MAYUMI WATANABE
Potential Copper Shortages Loom:
Demand-side Measures Are Needed
The International Copper Study Group (ICSG) forecasts that this year will see a 162,000-ton copper surplus globally, and a 94,000-ton surplus in 2025. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the EU classify copper as a critical mineral vulnerable to supply risks. The main concern is surging demand, driven by diversified power transmission networks, as well as a surge in AI-driven data traffic globally that will outpace supply growth.
Copper means a lot to Japan, which has a total copper refining capacity of 1.7 million tons/ year, the world’s second largest after China. Japan is also the world’s fourth largest exporter of refined copper products called copper cathode. However, the country’s four copper cathode producers rely entirely on imports for the ore concentrate.
In June, the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) decided to drive more investments into overseas copper mines by increasing state ownership of future mining projects. Equally significant, it also announced a plan to launch a framework that will encourage new businesses in the metal recycling industry.
Will these measures be sufficient to secure Japan’s copper concentrate needs, which are about five million tons/ year? Can other measures, especially on the demand side, be implemented to help manage possible shortages?
ICGS global refined copper balance (tons)
|
2011 |
-214,000 |
|
2012 |
-421,000 |
|
2013 |
-272,000 |
|
2014 |
-414,000 |
|
2015 |
-153,000 |
|
2016 |
-152,000 |
|
2017 |
-261,000 |
|
2018 |
-404,000 |
|
2019 |
-382,000 |
|
2020 |
-479,000 |
|
2021 |
-458,000 |
|
2022 |
-461,000 |
|
2023 |
-3,000 |
|
2024 (forecast) |
162,000 |
|
2025 (forecast) |
94,000 |
Copper threat
On June 7, ANRE told the Sub-committee on Resources and Fuel about the plan to raise state ownership of copper mining projects overseas. Presently, the Japanese state can own up to 50% of such projects, but now the cap will be increased to 75% by late FY2024.
This will help to financially support a dozen copper upstream players – consisting of six producers and six trading houses – to acquire interests in untapped resources, notably in Africa, which is the new copper frontier. In the last three years, Japanese companies have sold mines in Chile and Canada because they were running operating losses.
After the sale, Japan’s copper ore self-sufficiency rate fell to less than 40%, far from the 2030 goal of 80%. Copper producers also said that the mines’ bargaining power in ore price negotiations is getting stronger.
Even if copper cathode prices rise on strong demand prospects, the producers will be paying more for the ores. Ideally, they need to have direct access to ore resources.
Recent copper mine sales
|
Sellers |
Mine name |
Year of sale |
|
Sumitomo Metal Mining, Sumitomo Corporation |
Sierra Gorda (Chile) |
2021 |
|
JX Nippon Mining |
Caserones (Chile) |
2023 |
|
Dowa Metal Mines |
Cariboo Copper (Canada) |
2024 |
Japanese companies hold stakes in 20 copper mines overseas, mostly in South America. Japan imports about five million tons/ year of copper ore concentrate to produce 1-1.5 million tons/ year of cathode for domestic and export markets.
This amount is not expected to change significantly as domestic refining facilities are unlikely to be expanded. Even if domestic demand rises 30% to 1.35 million tons in 2040 (over 2022), this is within the capacity of the present facilities of roughly 1.7 million tons/ year.
New copper ore frontiers: Africa and at home
Copper cathode can be produced by remelting scrap, but copper concentrate contains other metals. Chilean copper concentrate contains gold, silver, sulfuric acid and rare metals that are classified as “critical resources” in some countries; these include selenium, molybdenum, and rhenium.
Africa is a new frontier for copper concentrate. Over 50 years ago, ENEOS group had a project in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) but political turmoil forced it to exit. Today, Japan does not import any copper concentrate from Africa. However, new overseas mine projects in the last decade were mostly in Africa.
The increased Japanese state ownership of mining projects is effective in managing country risks; for example, many African governments have assertive mining policies. Although Africa is geographically far from Japan, it is important in order to diversify supply sources as much as possible to reduce risks. These include resource nationalism-driven raw material export halts, as well as damage to ports and mines due to armed conflicts and weather, etc.
Shipping is often delayed by labor strikes, so Japanese copper producers keep high concentrate inventories for several months. However, it is always more reassuring to have suppliers closer to home. Having local supplies is important, and recycling is a solution in this matter.
Japan’s copper recycling rate is over 80%, reproducing about 1 million tons / year. On June 7, ANRE said it will design a framework to encourage more recycling businesses because labor shortages have led to closures of recycling firms.
Upstream development and recycling have been a core strategy for all metals industries. Other actions include export restrictions and restart of domestic copper mines. Japan exports around 0.4 million tons/ year of recycled copper, which is nearly half of domestic recycled supplies. China is the biggest buyer.
The last of Japan’s copper mines closed in 1994 due to high operational costs. But according to the National Institute of Material Science, Japan has 38 million tons of copper ore deposits, or about 8% of the global reserve.
Demand-side measures
Upstream development, recycling, and export controls are supply-side measures. There are also demand-side measures to decrease copper consumption and switch to other materials, but governments have not been keen to act since they strain consumers. Demand-side measures, however, are needed since there are limits to supply growth.
In the past, demand measures were implemented as a last resort when there was a buying frenzy caused by supply tightness. In 1938, Japan began to regulate copper usage and launched a ration system amid shortages caused by the Depression and World War 2. Post 1945 there was no crisis that triggered copper demand measures, but there was a crisis hitting other resources.
In 2022, the Ministry of Environment launched programs to curb helium gas consumption for water and air quality analysis, as geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf region cut supplies from Qatar, Japan’s major import source. The plans to purchase helium from Russia ceased due to the Ukraine invasion.
The MoE programs consisted of substitution, usage reduction and increased recycling. Other helium users also made switches: Argon for optical fiber and semiconductor manufacturing; hydrogen and nitrogen for leak tests, etc. In the end, helium rationing was avoided, but consumers continue conservation measures.
MoE helium measures
|
Substitution |
Hydrogen for gas chromatographic separation Nitrogen for the atmospheric pressure gas chromatography process Use solutions or solids where applicable |
|
Usage reduction |
Use of gas saver device or switch to nitrogen during stand-by; Turn off the analysis equipment when not used; Reduce the use frequency by combining several tests into one; Replace 99.95% helium filter with 99.999% device: Install gas savers to all analysis equipment Shift to equipment with helium freezing function |
|
Recycling |
Collect gas residue in the equipment after use, if possible; capture helium in the room. |
Possible copper demand-side measures
Driven by high prices, Japanese copper consumers have been practicing demand-side approaches voluntarily. Automotive manufacturers have set a price threshold, such as Grade-A copper cathode at $100,000/ ton to start looking for substitutions. This might be a one-time process or may become a permanent practice.
For example, radiators used in air conditioning were made of copper; but aluminum, which costs one third of copper, replaced it almost entirely. Aluminum’s electricity conductivity is lower than copper, but it is lightweight. Similarly, copper cables have been replaced by aluminum for installations where weight becomes an issue.
The woes over availability of fossil fuel, electricity, and battery metals are driving resource saving solutions. For copper, one solution is removing copper cables in buildings, and installing wireless microwave power transmission systems. This is a new technology. Radio wave frequency licensing for power transmission only began in 2022.
But there are mounting issues to clear such as health concerns if exposed to microwave transporting power. Another approach sought by tech startups is appliances that do not require electricity but rather run on kinetic energy and other energies, thus eliminating any need for power transmission lines or batteries.
There is no single solution to resource strategies. Instead, multiple and diversified approaches from both the supply and demand sides are seen as optimal strategies. This is widely understood in theory, but in practice consumers have been reluctant to explore substitutions and other demand-side measures until hit by critical situations.
Demand-side measures imposed costs for buying new equipment and changing processes. However, the war in Ukraine and mounting geopolitical tensions elsewhere are gradually changing this mindset. More businesses are becoming aware that they need to intensify efforts to safeguard supply chains and find substitutes for critical raw materials.
Copper has become expensive at $10,000/ ton. The accelerating race over untapped African copper reserves may change buyer awareness on copper consumption. But there are positive sides to this development. Just as the green transformation drives innovations to resolve climate issues, resource supply constraints may open new opportunities and a suite of new solutions.
BY JOHN VAROLI
This weekly column focuses on energy events in Asia and the Pacific
AI / Electricity usage
Bill Gates urged not to worry about the amount of power to run new generative AI systems. Data centers will drive a rise in global electricity usage of between 2-6%, but Gates believes that investments in sustainable energy can offset increases in data center emissions. In May, Microsoft said its GHGs had risen by a third since 2020, mostly due to new data centers.
APAC / Energy consumption
In 2023, APAC consumed 78% of the world’s total energy, according to the Statistical Review of World Energy.
Asia / AI
To promote the wider adoption of AI, companies that run data centers in Asia must invest over $100 billion to expand their capacity through 2030, said Mayank Maheshwari, an energy analyst at Morgan Stanley.
China / Coal
China’s growing LNG imports haven’t reduced or slowed the growth of its coal consumption. Since 2017, China’s coal demand has increased more than LNG imports every year. In the power sector, which accounts for 60% of China’s total coal usage, since 2015 the share of natural gas generation has remained at 3%.
China / LNG
China has taken advantage of low spot market prices to boost the amount of gas in storage. As storage fills and spot prices rise, China’s intake is likely to taper over the summer. The country bought a record 55 MMT of gas from overland pipelines and sea-borne LNG in the first five months of 2024.
Coal
APAC was a major contributor in global coal production in 2023, accounting for 79% of total output, said the Statistical Review of World Energy. APAC’s output was up 6% over 2022. Activity was mostly in Australia, China, India, and Indonesia, which accounted for 97% of the region’s production.
Indonesia / CRMs
BASF pulled out of a $2.6 billion nickel-cobalt refining complex in Weda Bay. Activists highlighted the plight of uncontacted people in the area. Despite the scrapping of the refinery project, Weda Bay Nickel – the world’s biggest nickel mine – is set to continue. The nickel is destined for EV car batteries.
Malaysia / Taiwan / Renewables
Malaysia’s Solarvest inked a partnership with GreenRock Energy (Taiwan) to develop 1 GW of renewable energy projects in their respective countries over the next five years.
South Korea / SMRs
South Korea seeks to become a significant player in the construction of small modular reactors (SMRs). The govt will provide $216 million to develop an SMR industrial hub to be built in Gyeongju, which will include manufacturing technology.
A selection of domestic and international events we believe will have an impact on Japanese energy
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NEWS
・METI seeks to increase capacity to 5 GW for long-term decarbonized power source auction in early 2025
・METI to support nine CCS projects for commercialization by 2030
・U.S. hedge fund Citadel to enter Japan’s power market, acquiring market maker Energy Grid