
ANALYSIS
FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE: JAPAN’S CHANGING APPROACH TO RESOURCE DIPLOMACY
JAPANESE SMRs MOVE FORWARD…
BUT NOT IN JAPAN
ASIA PACIFIC REVIEW
This column provides a brief overview of the region’s main energy events from the past week
NEWS
WIND POWER AND OTHER RENEWABLES
CARBON CAPTURE & SYNTHETIC FUELS
EVENTS
June 4-5 Kyushu Innovation Week / Kyushu GX Decarbonization Expo @ Marine Messe Fukuoka
June 4-6 AXIA EXPO 2025 (Hydrogen and Ammonia Next-Generation Energy Exhibition) @ Aichi Sky Expo
June 15-17 G7 Summit @ Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada
June 18-20 Japan Energy Summit & Exhibition ` Tokyo Big Sight
PUBLISHER
K. K. Yuri Group
Editorial Team
Yuriy Humber (Chief Editor)
John Varoli (Senior Editor, Americas)
Kyoko Fukuda (Data, Events)
Magdalena Osumi (Renewables & Storage)
Filippo Pedretti (Thermal, CCS, Nuclear)
Tetsuji Tomita (Power Market, Hydrogen)
George Hoffman (Sales, Business Development)
Tim Young (Design)
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Grid operators offer upgrade plans to meet 9 GW of new data center capacity
(Government statement, May 29)
TAKEAWAY: A full discussion of the Watt-Bit initiative was published in the Japan NRG Analysis section on May 19, 2025. This is one of the most urgent initiatives at the moment and policy discussions are moving quickly. We expect further details on locations and capacity forecasts to be made during the summer. A summary of policy recommendations is likely to be released after the next working group meeting.
METI seeks next LTDA rounds with stricter rules for BESS, LNG focus
(Government statement, May 28)
Key points:
This is a drop from previous rounds, where auctioned capacity exceeded the set cap.
TAKEAWAY: The changes, especially a tighter scope for batteries and requirements than in earlier rounds, showcase much stricter rules on batteries, apparently in response to growing interest from developers and a way to secure more reliant technology. The draft also shows a continued strong preference for LNG, despite initial ministry claims that it’s a transitional power source. The perceived reliability of LNG generation is one of the reasons pushing its extended usage.
ANRE proposes funding method for large-scale grid development
(Government statement, May 23)
Upper House passes GX promo amendment, emissions trading participation mandatory
(Denki Shimbun, May 29)

Guarantee proposed for ¥1.8 trillion Hokkaido-Honshu subsea power cable
(Nikkei, May 29)
TAKEAWAY: The Hokkaido-Honshu cable project reflects a critical turning point for Japan’s energy transition. While debt guarantees are a positive step, they are not sufficient on their own. Given the scale and the long construction timeline, more proactive and direct public financing will also be needed. To speed up grid upgrades to improve the transmission network, the govt needs to attract private investment, which proved essential in large-scale interconnection infrastructure like NordLink connecting Germany and Norway.
Japan considers inflation-linked reforms to transmission fee rules
(Government statement, May 29)
Consumer price changes in %, YoY

Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan
ANRE holds off on mandatory supply system in balancing market
(Government statement, May 28)
METI launches new subcommittee for electricity and gas industry
(Government statement, May 23)
FIT certificate prices rise as policy shift boosts demand
(Denki Shimbun, May 26)
April intraday power trades fall for first time in five months
(Denki Shimbun, May 28)
EEX welcomes Okachi as first non-clearing member from Japan
(Company statement, May 27)
Osaka Gas climbs to No. 2 in latest power sales ranking
(Energy Information Center, May 28)
Rank | Company | Sales (GWh) | Previous Rank |
1 | Tokyo Gas | 1,431 | 1 |
2 | Osaka Gas | 882 | 4 |
3 | Ennet | 712 | 2 |
4 | ENEOS Power | 642 | 5 |
5 | Marubeni Power Retail | 638 | 3 |
6 | SB Power | 590 | 8 |
7 | Mitsuuroko Green Energy | 518 | 6 |
8 | au Energy & Life | 508 | 11 |
9 | CD Energy Direct | 464 | 7 |
10 | Halene (Haruené) | 445 | 10 |

Air Water to partner with Mikasa City in hydrogen and renewables
(Company statement, May 23)
JFE Engineering achieves breakthrough ratio with hydrogen co-firing
(Company statement, May 29)
Start of design and verification of hydrogen infrastructure at Nagoya
(Company statement, May 27)
Japan explores subsurface hydrogen production using serpentinization
(Nikkei, May 24)

Toshiba launches packages with 90% size reduction for PV inverters
(Company statement, May 20)
TAKEAWAY: This collaboration showcases how Japan’s semiconductor expertise is used globally for powering next-gen solar tech. The news about ROHM’s SiC MOSFET modules and Toshiba’s latest SiC MOSFET packages are closely linked as they both highlight advancements in silicon carbide (SiC) semiconductor tech, which is crucial for improving solar systems. SiC MOSFETs offer higher efficiency, smaller size, and better heat resistance than current silicon units, enabling more compact and efficient solar inverters. This reduces power loss, extends lifespan, and boosts power density, thus improving cost-effectiveness.
Japan’s first PSC demo on thermal power plant enclosure
(Company statement, May 29)
Ishizaka Sangyo opens solar panel recycling plant in Saitama
(Company statement, May 26)
TAKEAWAY: Japan’s solar boom has brought clean energy to millions of rooftops, but a looming challenge is approaching: end-of-life solar panels. With many installations from the early 2000s nearing retirement, waste volumes are set to surge around 2030. Ishizaka Sangyo’s new recycling plant in Saitama uses advanced methods to recover valuable materials. However, Japan still lacks clear national regulations mandating panel recycling or producer responsibility. To avoid a future waste crisis, Japan must urgently establish legal frameworks and expand recycling infrastructure in line with solar ambitions.
Startup Nobest launches remote monitoring system for solar farms
(Company statement, May 26)
TAKEAWAY: The launch of Nobest IoT comes at a timely moment amid rising cybersecurity concerns in the solar sector. With features like AI-based fault detection, centralized management, and domestic development, Nobest IoT seeks to offer a more secure alternative. This aligns with growing global and domestic efforts to protect energy infrastructure from cyber threats and reduce dependence on potentially vulnerable foreign equipment. For instance, Sankei Shimbun reported in May 2024 an incident in which hackers exploited a known flaw in 800 remote monitoring devices, leading to bank account thefts.
Shizen completes rooftop solar PV system in Indonesia
(Company statement, May 29)
Toyota Tsusho acquires stake in battery components producer
(Company statement, May 16)
KEPCO launches battery storage support service
(Company statement, May 28)
Battery system adopted for offshore floating data center pilot
(Company statement, May 21)
NYK completes battery-powered fully electric workboat
(Company statement, May 26)

Eurus Energy completes Japan’s largest onshore wind farm
(Company statement, Nikkei, May 27)
Ministries report on renewable energy expansion
(Government statement, May 27)
MOL to join offshore wind project in Taiwan
(Company statement, May 9)
Offshore wind faces further headwinds due to rising costs
(Nikkei, May 26)
TAKEAWAY: Although the article primarily captures ongoing debates, the govt should take seriously the negative sentiments expressed by stakeholders toward the proposed changes to future tenders. Progress on projects awarded in the first three rounds has been slower than expected, with most still in the planning phase.
KME and Kyocera seek further expansion in renewables
(Company statement, May 27)
Shipping association sets guidelines for GHGs of Ro-Ro ships
(Company statement, May 26)

IHI and NuScale Power complete wall module for SMR project in Romania
(NikkeiAsia, May 28)
TAKEAWAY: See this issue’s Analysis section.
KEPCO gets approval for dry storage facility at Takahama NPP
(Company statement, May 28)
Third-party committee says safety satisfactory at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP
(Nikkei, May 28)
Kyushu Electric’s Genkai NPP to restart
(Company statement, May 30)
Chugoku Electric to invest in disaster prevention in Shimane Pref
(Nikkei, May 30)

JERA interested in Alaska LNG project ahead of energy summit
(Bloomberg, May 30)
Kyushu Electric inks 20 yr deal with U.S. supplier for LNG
(Company statement, May 29)
TAKEAWAY: This deal was announced on the same day as Kyushu Electric’s one from Lake Charles. For such companies, securing long-term agreements is a way to cover themselves from future market shocks. But, there is politics at play – Trump wants Japan to buy more American LNG. Also, these contracts come without destination clauses. This is crucial because Japan’s own LNG demand is shrinking, while cross-border trading is intensifying.
MOL wants govt help after EU sanctioned LNG tankers
(Bloomberg, May 27)
LNG stocks up over previous week, up YoY
(Government data, May 28)

Tokyo Govt and Tokyo Gas ink partnership for carbon neutrality
(Government statement, May 26)
Mitsubishi-backed e-fuel firm building SAF plant in Texas
(Company statement, May 20)
Japan and Tanzania agree on JCM, marking 30th partner country
(Government statement, May 28)
MHI agrees with Uzbekistan for decarbonization study
(Company statement, May 26)
ANALYSIS
BY PARUL BAKSHI
Japan’s Resource Diplomacy Evolves Into Market Architecture
Japan’s natural resource diplomacy is no longer just about shielding domestic industries from supply shocks. Rather, it’s now actively co-architecting markets, shaping which technologies scale and where companies place their bets.
After decades of debating new ways to access critical minerals, Japan is starting to wield its institutional tools more assertively – making direct investments, underwriting high-risk ventures, and expanding state finance to influence global supply chains. This marks a shift from strategic intent to operational action.
Two recent deals illustrate this. JOGMEC backed a rare earth refinery in France – its first support for a stand-alone overseas processing facility. Meanwhile, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) committed $466 million to Chile’s state copper giant, Codelco, as part of a larger co-financing package to secure supplies for Japanese firms.
Such moves go beyond raw material access. They reflect Tokyo’s recognition that mineral security today means engaging across the value chain. What began in the 2010s as risk mitigation has matured into a state-enabled resource diplomacy ecosystem – one suited for an era of geopolitical fragmentation and technological chokepoints.
Seen this way, Japan’s resource push is not just about extraction, but systems-building. It favours selective interdependence and strategic sovereignty without full decoupling from China. For foreign and domestic firms alike, this signals a more activist Japanese industrial policy – full of opportunity, but governed on tighter terms.
From minerals to strategy
Japan’s status as a high-tech manufacturer has long demanded a strategic approach to mineral security. Applications in batteries, solar panels, wind turbines and hydrogen electrolyzers have only heightened this need, linking mineral inputs to clean energy and industrial goals.
Anchored by METI’s 35-item critical minerals list, which was updated in 2024 to include uranium, Japan’s mineral diplomacy now underpins the broader Green and Digital Transformation strategies (ie GX and DX). These aim to mobilize ¥150 trillion in public–private investment for net zero, while upgrading Japan’s digital and industrial base.
The alignment of climate, digital, and industrial goals reframes minerals as strategic enablers of techno-industrial competitiveness. This evolution occurs amid escalating supply chain politics with Washington’s tariffs and Beijing’s export curbs casting a long shadow on economic planning.
Japan’s own 2010 rare earths shock – when China suspended exports during a maritime dispute – triggered a decade of diversification and long-term offtakes, much of it led by the then-named Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, which in 2022 was renamed Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security to reflect a renewed focus.
Today, JOGMEC and JBIC – Japan’s chief state-backed financial tools – have seen their mandates expand accordingly. Both are now central to Japan’s economic security strategy, taking on roles well beyond their historical remits.
Flow of metal resources development & JOGMEC activities

Source: JOGMEC
Finance arms of mineral strategy
JOGMEC’s legal cap on overseas equity stakes was lifted from 50% to 75% in 2022, alongside new authorization to issue debt guarantees. That has allowed it to chase riskier, priority projects – particularly in lithium, cobalt and rare earths. The organization spans the full development cycle from exploration to production, with government-backed insurance and resource diplomacy to match.
Between 2004 and 2020, JOGMEC participated in more than 100 projects, deploying over $600 million across 15 countries. Its stockpiling policy was also revised in 2020, allowing it to release or acquire reserves in response to supply shocks, with terms kept confidential to avoid market disruption.
JBIC, meanwhile, repositioned itself as more than just a financier of Japanese firms overseas. Its latest business plan (FY2024–26) highlights carbon neutrality, semiconductor resilience and global supply chain robustness. JBIC now backs clean tech, digital infrastructure, and even global startups – supporting both large corporates and export-focused SMEs. Its toolkit includes debt, equity and bilateral project finance.
The pair have complementary roles: JOGMEC absorbs upstream risk; JBIC builds out the midstream and downstream. Together, they underpin Japan’s broader policy framework, shaped by the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act. This legislation formalized cross-ministry coordination and introduced “specified important materials,” giving the state broader authority to intervene in strategic supply chains.
These tools are now deployed alongside credit lines, industrial subsidies, and foreign aid – designed not only to build resilience, but to exert influence over infrastructure, technologies, and commercial norms.
JBIC’s role in global supply chain reconstruction

Source: JBIC
From access to architecture
Japan’s approach has evolved from mineral access to ecosystem design. This shift is evident in its geographically tiered strategy, outlined in the GX Diplomacy Guidelines. Stable countries like Australia and Canada receive direct investment. Chile, Peru, and the Philippines are targeted via public–private dialogues. Higher-risk markets, particularly in Africa, are accessed through trilateral or multilateral initiatives with allies.
Bilateral and multilateral partnerships are multiplying. A 2023 mineral supply chain agreement with the U.S. expanded into a pact with South Korea covering semiconductors and critical minerals. Japan is investing in mineral processing centers in Vietnam and co-developing nickel value chains in the Philippines. Ties with France and the UK are deepening, and joint ventures in Africa are being negotiated.
Japan’s traditional commodity procurement agents, the trading houses, are also active. Sumitomo Corp has worked to procure rare earth elements in Kazakhstan and Vietnam, and in February 2023 signed an exclusive rare earths deal for Japan with MP Materials.
In a quid pro quo, Japan’s overseas aid went to port infrastructure in Madagascar to facilitate nickel extraction. Meanwhile, Japan remains a founding member of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and the Quad’s Critical Minerals Working Group – efforts that seek to set global standards for ESG, traceability, and sustainable mining.
At the G7 in Hiroshima in 2023, Japan pushed through a Five-Point Plan for Critical Mineral Security, backed by ¥200 billion in commitments. Regional frameworks like the Asia Zero Emissions Community (AZEC) and the Asia Energy Transition Initiative (AETI) embed mineral supply into broader decarbonization efforts.
The result is a web of projects, institutions and rules – what might be called curated interdependence. Japan is building trust-based supply chain ecosystems, while limiting exposure to volatility and techno-nationalist blocs. The real strategic asset is no longer just the mineral, but the platform, the rules, and the alliances that govern it.
Signals to business
For companies, Japan’s resource diplomacy introduces a new landscape of signals and incentives. Domestic firms in strategic sectors are likely to benefit from subsidies, insurance, and joint ventures, especially where market risks are high or technologies remain pre-commercial.
Through METI’s ¥2 trillion Green Innovation Fund, administered by NEDO, Japan is bankrolling early-stage projects such as Sumitomo Chemical and JERA’s lithium-ion battery reuse process. The Critical Minerals Subsidy Scheme overseen by JOGMEC covers up to half of eligible costs for approved ventures.
Foreign firms face a different dynamic. They may encounter more scrutiny – or encouragement – to form partnerships with Japanese counterparts. This is not protectionism as much as it is market design. Japan wants control over how and where risk is sourced, and where value accumulates.
This design extends overseas. State funding is increasingly tied to JVs in third-country markets. In Australia, JBIC backed Japanese investments in Lynas, helping it become the first commercial producer of heavy rare earths outside China. The Japan–France Rare Earth Corp, a public-private partnership between JOGMEC, Iwatani, and France’s Caremag, is building a rare earth separation facility in France that could eventually meet a fifth of Japan’s demand for certain oxides like dysprosium and terbium.
Japan’s involvement is not just financial. It includes diplomatic facilitation and demand-side guarantees to stabilise investor expectations – ensuring private capital flows into projects aligned with national priorities.
Where technologies are promising but risky, the state is offering incentives to co-develop and de-risk them – shaping entire ecosystems, not just single ventures. The goal is to embed innovation within Japan’s supply chains, not outsource it.
Foreign investors, especially those in projects with environmental or social footprints, will need to interpret where Japan signals openness – and where it expects tighter alignment on ESG, data sharing, or strategic autonomy. Japanese firms themselves are being pushed to meet higher standards, disclose more, and demonstrate compliance.
This may raise long-term costs, but it also offers reputational rewards in a global market hungry for verified, responsibly sourced minerals.
Critical Minerals Subsidy Scheme projects

Source: JOGMEC
A platform strategy
Ultimately, Japan is betting on interdependence – not through laissez-faire openness, but rather through curated collaboration. From lithium mines to rare earth refineries, from trading house diplomacy to bilateral rulemaking, Tokyo is building a system that mixes industrial logic with statecraft.
Industries tied to clean energy, digital infrastructure, and critical materials will increasingly find themselves nested within these state-backed ecosystems – sheltered from certain market risks, but subject to more oversight. That duality is what makes Japan’s new resource diplomacy not just a geopolitical hedge, but a market-shaping force.
Dr. Parul Bakshi is a Japan Foundation Indo-Pacific Partnership Fellow at the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Future Initiatives and a Visiting Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
ANALYSIS
BY FILIPPO PEDRETTI
Japanese SMRs Move Forward but Not in Japan
Japanese firms are developing Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), nuclear units that are touted as the sector’s next phase and best bet to further spread nuclear power across the globe, especially to cash-strapped countries. Most significant developments by Japanese companies, however, are taking place outside of the country.
With a capacity of under 300 MW, SMRs comprises diverse kinds of technologies, including conventional reactors such as BWRs/PWRs and experimental ones. They are modular, meaning the components can be mass-produced and assembled on site.
Hyped as a game changer for the nuclear industry, the SMR is still an underdeveloped technology, with only Russia and China having commercially operable reactors. In April, however, the technology took a big step forward in G7 countries, when a project using GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy’s BWRX-300 secured permission to begin construction in Canada.
Another Japanese firm is in talks to build an SMR in the U.S. based on Japan’s own innovative gas-cooling technology. That project is still in the early stages, but it’s already attracting attention from big energy users, such as data center companies, which are eager to find solutions to their power hungry business.
Proponents of SMRs hope such projects will pave the way to develop a safer, easier to deploy nuclear power source that can balance out the rising wave of variable renewable energy. With Japan’s domestic nuclear sector slow to reemerge, success abroad is seen as vital to realizing SMRs in a real, commercial setting. A positive track record of SMRs operating overseas would pave the way to the tech’s introduction in Japan’s home market.
The model
One of the most advanced and prominent Japanese SMR projects abroad is the BWRX-300, which is a 300-MWe developed by GEH, a joint venture between U.S.-based GE Vernova and Hitachi. The model includes components from GEH’s Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) and Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR).
One of its most attractive features is the passive safety mechanism. Conventional reactors rely on active cooling systems, but the BWRX-300 can shut down and cool itself through natural circulation. This is obtained through a system that provides natural circulation of water to cool the reactor without the need of an active operator. This is crucial in case of an earthquake or tsunami. In addition, this feature helps to lower costs.


Source: GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
The first BWRX-300 is already on the path to realization. Last month, Ontario Power Generation (OPG) secured a permit to build the first one at its Darlington New Nuclear Project site. This project is slated to become a hub with up to four SMRs, with units 2 through 4 scheduled to begin operations between 2034 and 2036. The max licensed capacity of the site is 4,800 MW, so in time further reactors may be added.
GEH will provide in-core structures, a control rod drive mechanism, and a control rod drive hydraulic unit. Japanese suppliers will provide major components, and by doing so, also help develop human resources in Japan that can specialize in the sector. By building experience in working with the new reactor model, the company will gain know-how and expertise for further development of SMRs in Japan.
If successful, the first BWRX-300 will serve as the pathfinder for future SMR deployments in the province and then across Canada.
Permits and costs
In 2021, OPG selected GEH’s predecessor as its technology partner. After preparatory work such as foundation digging, the permit from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission finally allowed the company to proceed. The licence is valid until the end of March 31, 2035 and is part of the regulatory oversight to govern the project.
The CNSC’s decision followed an extensive two-part public hearing in October 2024 and then in January 2025. All submissions and perspectives were considered, including those from local residents, environmental experts, and Indigenous groups.
In 2022, the company applied for the current permit, which pertains to construction only. Before progressing to reactor operation, the company must secure another permit for operations. GEH and OPG expect the reactors to start about FY2029 or FY2030 and to operate for around 65 years.
Costs for the Darlington project could reach $15 billion, including from licensing and construction to interest on financing. The first SMR unit is forecasted at $4.45 billion, and related infrastructure costs will be $1.17 billion, for a total of $5.62 billion.
The cost estimates for the second, third, and fourth SMRs are not yet finalized, but OPG expects each successive unit to be less costly with the fourth unit estimated at $3 billion.
The above figures are much higher than previous GEH’s estimates, which were around $2,250-2,500/ kW, or $700 million-$750 million for a single 300 MW unit. Such a price tag made the units competitive with other energy sources, especially thermal ones like gas.
Still, OPG thinks it can keep the electricity cost to around $0.1088/ kWh. While higher than the $0.09/ kWh of GEH earlier estimates, according to OPG this will both be enough to recover the investment and stay competitive with other sources, especially renewables.
More projects
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic in Europe the BWRX-300 is gaining traction in the UK’s plans for a fleet of SMR facilities. The government shortlisted three potential SMR technologies, with the BWRX-300 a contender. The others are from Holtec and Rolls-Royce. Westinghouse was also on the list, but dropped out in April.
Some SMRs are eschewing the traditional BWR and LWR nuclear technologies and experimenting with very different systems that claim to be even safer and more agile.
Recently, Coral Capital invested in ZettaJoule, a Japanese startup developing an SMR built on a high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR). The company recently secured follow-on funding led by Globis Capital Partners, with participation from Archetype Ventures, HAX, etc.
Unlike reactors relying on water cooling, ZettaJoule’s proposed design uses helium as a coolant and graphite as a moderator. This enables the reactor to operate at high temperatures, up to 900°C, and should also minimize meltdown risks.
ZettaJoule intends to unite Japanese suppliers and international regulators and investors. The startup is partnering with a U.S. university to build a demo reactor in Texas by the early 2030s, with plans for commercial deployment later that decade.
Source: ZettaJoule
Getting a permit for new technology takes years – five or more. But ZettaJoule’s plan to have the initial reactor project in the U.S. as a research facility should expedite permissions to as little as 12-15 months, according to the company.
The permit application should also be helped by the fact that Japan has operated such tech for decades. And once a research reactor has a track record working in the U.S., securing approval for a commercial-scale unit should be easier, according to ZettaJoule.
The startup has assembled an international and experienced team spanning several disciplines. It is led by an ex-Sumitomo Corp strategist for commercialization with a former senior Mitsubishi Heavy Industries executive as the deputy CEO. JAEA’s HTGR pioneers and former nuclear regulators from Canada and the U.S. are among those managing the technical and policy challenges ZettaJoules faces.
The level of seniority among ZettaJoules leaders signals a further change in Japan’s attitude towards SMRs, whose research was also affected by the negative opinion towards nuclear power in the wake of Fukushima in 2011.
After the post-Fukushima cold approach towards nuclear power, SMRs included, change in attitude began also thanks to companies like engineering giants IHI Corp and JGC Holdings, which took part in the SMR business through investment in the U.S. specialist NuScale. They made an investment of $20 million and $40 million each. Just a few days ago, IHI said it completed a prototype wall module for NuScale’s SMR plant project in Romania set to open by 2030. IHI too hopes that it will bring such technology and related expertise to Japan.
Other Japanese firms reportedly working on SMR projects include Toshiba and MHI. The latter is believed to be developing a PWR-type SMR unit.
Conclusion
On paper, SMRs promise to be a flexible and cheaper alternative to traditional large-scale nuclear reactors that often face delays to regulatory hurdles and community opposition. SMRs could be suitable for powering remote communities and supporting industrial operations, especially in helping to meet the growing energy demand that is accompanying the rise of generative AI.
However, G7 nations have not made SMRs a priority. Only Russia and China have commercial SMR operations, with the former starting in May 2020, and China following in December 2023. But if technologies such as those promoted by GEH and ZettaJoule prove themselves commercially viable, this could open the door to a new wave of enthusiasm for nuclear power, including in Japan.
That’s still a large “if”. An SMR flagship project by Nuscale in the U.S. was recently cancelled due to an almost doubling of costs to $9.3 billion. And while SMR construction costs tend to be less than for conventional reactors, SMRs still need to show their profitability in cost-per-output terms, something difficult given the loss of economy of scale.
Relying on progress overseas is not the easiest path for Japanese industry, but it may be their only option at present. Japan’s nuclear regulator remains extremely conservative and slow to engage in new technology reviews. The government lacks a detailed strategy or roadmap for SMRs. Aside from a very general timeline, Tokyo energy planners have on occasion made scattered remarks about the potential to substitute aging reactors with smaller versions.
The cooler reception to SMRs inside Japan despite momentum for the technology overseas is in part due to the nuclear sector’s general difficulties at home. Most politicians are wary of bringing up new nuclear facilities when the majority of the existing ones have yet to restart. The same is largely true for domestic nuclear plant operators, which have yet to recoup the vast sums spent on fortifying existing stations to meet stricter safety standards.
And so it is left to the technologists to forge ahead – overseas. As ever, they will be judged on how well their projects deliver in terms of cost and time. Industry leaders know that the road ahead is long and far from simple. Betting on SMRs as a near-term solution for Japan at this point is little more than wishful thinking.
ASIA ENERGY REVIEW
BY JOHN VAROLI
A brief overview of the region’s main energy events from the past week
Asia / Fossil fuels
The Asia Clean Energy Coalition said the region “remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels”, with over 85% of its energy still sourced from non-renewable sources.
Asia / LNG
Imports of LNG to Asia are stable, on track to reach 22.53 Mt in May, up slightly from 21.89 Mt in April, according to commodities analysts at Kpler.
Australia / LNG
Viva Energy received an environmental permit for its proposed LNG terminal in Geelong. It will enable the market in Victoria to connect to supply sources in north Australia.
China / Coal
China is producing more coal than it can consume, resulting in a 42% YoY increase in mine stockpiles and a 25% annual rise in inventories at northern Bohai area ports.
China / Hydrogen
Oil and gas major Sinopec unveiled a $690 million venture capital fund to support early-stage hydrogen investments and technologies.
China / Russian gas
Gazprom delivered the first 100 bcm of natural gas via the Power of Siberia pipeline, as part of contracted volumes exceeding 1 trillion cubic meters. In 2027, Gazprom will start deliveries of gas to China via a second pipeline – the Far Eastern route.
India / Coal imports
Coal imports decreased 7.9 % in FY2025, totalling 244 Mt. This drop resulted in foreign exchange savings of about $7.93 billion.
India / Solar and BESS
Sembcorp Industries won a 150 MW solar power project with a 300 MWh BESS, and a 25-yr PPA with SJVN. The firm now has a total of 6.3 GW renewables capacity across India.
Malaysia / Power generation
ACWA Power agreed with the govt to develop up to 12.5 GW of power generation capacity by 2040. Total investment will reach $10 billion.
Singapore / Carbon credits
Singapore inked a deal with Paraguay on carbon credits cooperation. This is its seventh partner; others are Papua New Guinea, Ghana, Bhutan, Peru, Chile, and Rwanda.
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NEWS:
・Grid operators offer plan for 9 GW of new data centers capacity
・METI seeks LTDA rounds with stricter rules for BESS and LNG focus
・ANRE eyes funding for large-scale grid upgrade