
April 4, 2022
NEWS
TOP
ENERGY TRANSITION & POLICY
ELECTRICITY MARKETS
OIL, GAS & MINING
ANALYSIS
LIMITED OPTIONS TIE JAPAN’S HAND
IN DEALING WITH LOOMING OIL SHOCK
Soaring LNG and crude oil prices, accelerated by Russia’s war with Ukraine, are starting to reverberate throughout the economy, inflicting a high toll on Japanese households and nearly all areas of commerce and industry. Some experts already refer to this situation as the Third Oil Shock, with the first such global energy shock having taken place in 1973, almost half a century ago. So far, state subsidies have been the main measure to combat energy-driven inflation. Last week Prime Minister Kishida ordered yet more of the same. But it’s increasingly clear that this won’t be enough and bolder steps will be needed.
PUTIN DEMANDS RUBLE PAYMENT FOR RUSSIAN GAS: DESPERATE PLOY OR START OF BIGGER CHANGES?
President Putin demanded that from April 1, all new energy contracts supplying Russian gas to “unfriendly” nations have to be settled in rubles. Japan, like other G7 nations, has rejected the notion. But the exchange rate of the ruble suggests this isn’t the end of the story. We lay out the potential mechanics of new “ruble-based” gas payments and show how this is part of a broader strategy Putin seeks to deploy in global commodity markets that may have much larger consequences.
GLOBAL VIEW
Chile to retire half of its coal-fired power plants. ING is the latest bank to stop financing new oil and gas deals. China’s top coal miner commits large portion of capex to renewables. The UK, Netherlands and U.S. plan new offshore wind auctions and investments. Details on these and more in our global wrap.
JOBS IN JAPAN’S ENERGY SECTOR
We begin a new monthly column that will examine trends in the labor market around Japan’s energy industry. This week: “The Great Talent Squeeze.”
PUBLISHER
K. K. Yuri Group
Editorial Team
Yuriy Humber (Editor-in-Chief)
John Varoli (Senior Editor, Americas)
Mayumi Watanabe (Japan)
Wilfried Goossens (Japan, Events)
Events

Regular Contributors
Chisaki Watanabe (Japan)
Takehiro Masutomo (Japan)
Daniel Shulman (Japan)
Art & Design
22 Graphics Inc.
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OFTEN USED ACRONYMS
METI The Ministry of Energy, Trade and Industry
MOE Ministry of Environment
ANRE Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
NEDO New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
KEPCO Kansai Electric Power Company
EPCO Electric Power Company
JCC Japan Crude Cocktail
JKM Japan Korea Market, the Platt’s LNG benchmark
CCUS Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage
mmbtu Million British Thermal Units
mb/d Million barrels per day
mtoe Million Tons of Oil Equivalent
kWh Kilowatt hours (electricity generation volume)

Japan’s top three banks to stop financing thermal coal mining
(Nikkei Asia, April 1)
New panel to write advanced nuclear reactor development roadmaps
(Japan MRG, March 28)
TAKEAWAY: Most small modular reactor projects outside Russia and China are driven by equipment vendors, while power operators are cautious on cost.
In addition to building realistic cost scenarios, the METI working group is tasked to answer questions that range from identifying the sites of the new reactors, creating new regulatory framework for safety inspection of new technologies, and ensuring the safety of nuclear plants that are operating.
See the Electricity Markets section for results of a recent public opinion survey that favors the restart of existing nuclear reactors.
Top oil major gives estimate for Japan hydrogen supply chain capex
(Japan NRG, March 29)
ENEOS hydrogen supply chain capex model (in billions of yen)
| Manufacturing green hydrogen | Cost of MCH conversion for transport | Transport (use existing vessels) | Local storage, delivery | Total | |
| Capex for 40,000 tons/ year output | 50 | 60 | 0 | 20 | 130 |
| Expansion to 300,000 tons/ year | 200 | 100 | 0 | 20 | 440 (includes 130 from the previous phase) |
TAKEAWAY: ENEOS and JERA are two of the top energy firms to have discussed the cost of hydrogen supply chain investments. Given the investment amounts estimates, there is now growing interest in re-opening the debate around building more green hydrogen production capacities in Japan, which would also allay energy security concerns.
Japanese households emit 5.9% more carbon in 2020: MoE
(Japan NRG, March 29)

Japan’s used cooking oil export price soars on clean oil demand in Asia
(Japan NRG, March 30)
TAKEAWAY: Higher grain and corn prices propelled by the Ukraine conflict, as well as soaring crude oil that triggered the rise in palm oil prices, are causing clashes between energy and food players in some markets. The junior partner in the ruling coalition, the Komeito Party, has pressed PM Kishida for more decisive measures to strengthen Japan’s food supply chain.
First carbon credit issued for Japan-Bangladeshi joint crediting mechanism project
(Japan NRG, March 31)
Japan to boost EV subsidies marginally to encourage transition
(Kyodo, March 25)
Seven-party consortium plans hydrogen hub for Kawasaki waterfront
(Company Statement, March 30)
Panasonic sets aside almost $5 billion for shift to batteries and hydrogen
(Asia Nikkei, April 1)
INPEX to join nuclear fusion race with startup investments
(Nikkei Asia, April 1)
Kansai Electric unveils plans to halve CO2 emissions from power generation by 2025
(Kankyo Business, March 30)
Nuclear power’s hidden carbon intensity: Opinion
(Asahi Ronza, March 28)

Majority of Japanese now want nuclear plants restarted
(Nikkei, March 28)
TAKEAWAY: This is possibly the first media survey in Japan to show the majority of the respondents being supporting of nuclear restarts since the Fukushima accident in March 2011. The numbers also tally closely with a poll conducted in March by the left-leaning (and largely anti-nuclear) Asahi Shimbun, which showed 48% of the respondents behind restarts. Should the mood continue, PM Kishida will feel safer about discussing pro-nuclear initiatives including government backing for new reactor designs. Still, given how long the public has been anti-nuclear and how much depends on matters outside the control of the national government, we do not expect the restart process to accelerate suddenly.
High costs drive Lpio and West Holdings out of electricity retail market
(Smart Japan, March 28)
TAKEAWAY: Lpio and West join Hope Energy in exiting power retail in recent weeks. Other companies have also been named in the media as taking similar steps. There remain more than 700 power retailers in Japan and clearly the majority do not have the resources to become serious players in the now changed electricity market, in which there is greater volatility and prices are rising. It would probably benefit Japan to have the number of retailers shrink, but unless the process is smoothly managed it will cause disruptions for households and businesses. Were that to occur on a noticeable scale in the near future, expect the government to quickly bring out tougher regulations on power retail.
Shipper Mitsui O.S.K. looks for entry points into offshore wind
(Dempa Publications, March 29)
Kansai Electric looks at 676.3 MW offshore wind project in Saga prefecture
(Denki Shimbun, March 31)
Chubu Electric invests in Indian energy company targeting off-grid consumers
(Nikkei, March 28)
All of Japan’s major power and gas companies due to raise rates in May
(Yomiuri Shimbun, March 31)
TEPCO begins move of nuclear power unit to Kashiwazaki city
(Denki Shimbun, March 31)
TAKEAWAY: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP is TEPCO’s only operable nuclear power plant and this is a step towards building better local relations to allow for its restart at some point in the future. At the earliest, it would be 2H 2022.
JERA announces plans to decommission 3.82 GW of capacity
(Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, April 1)

WAR IN UKRAINE:
METI announces policies to move away from Russian gas, oil, palladium
(Japan NRG, March 31)
TAKEAWAY: Japanese companies purchase raw materials on long-term contracts, often paying premiums over spot prices. This has worked out in their favor so far and may further help when negotiating new deals amid tight market conditions. As in the Kuwaiti case, supply guarantees may be packaged with financial aid and hydrogen/ammonia technology transfers.
There is also a risk, however, that a mentality to hoard supplies will see the government protecting too many raw materials, even those that are less critical or for which there are ready alternatives. Example: It is questionable if the ferrosilicon supply chain requires government support. Japanese steelmakers increased purchases from Russian Ferro Alloys and Mechel over the last two years for economic reasons, not because Russian companies were the only suppliers on the market. There are plenty of substitutes. On the other hand, Russia does have strong market power over low-carbon ferrochrome, used for specialty steel, and palladium.
Japan joins G7 in rejecting Russia’s demand to pay in rubles
(Japan NRG, March 29)
Hagiuda says Japan will not pull out of Arctic LNG
(Jiji, Japan NRG, Apr 1)
TAKEAWAY: In the last week, both PM Kishida and METI minister Hagiuda have said for the first time in a clear fashion that Japan will not exist Russian oil and gas interests. Without U.S. pressure for Japan to exit, the government is able to stick to its position that letting go of the rights Japanese firms hold in Russia will not help contain the war in Ukraine but will benefit either Russia or China. For now, it looks like the operating projects in Russia’s Sakhalin will continue to send their products to Japan, but new developments like Arctic LNG 2 will be frozen. At some point, that position too will become untenable. President Putin may well decide to push forward with Arctic LNG 2 regardless and label those partners that obstruct the process (or conversely do not help with financing and engineering know-how) to be “unfriendly”. When that point comes, Japan will need to act. But for now, the onus on Japanese energy buyers will be to search for alternative sources and prepare for a Plan B.
METI will not ban export of strategically critical energy and metal supplies
(Japan NRG, April 1)

Ruling coalition’s junior partner calls for reinstatement of gasoline ‘trigger clause’
(NHK, Mar 28)
TAKEAWAY: See the Analysis section for a deep dive on this issue.
Japan imports 652,809 tons of LNG, 660,560 kl of crude from Russia in Feb
(Japan NRG, March 30)


LNG stocks fall to 1.66 million tons
(Japan NRG, March 31)
METI forecasts 2022 jet fuel demand to surge by 16.1%
(Japan NRG, March 29)
Battery-grade nickel demand to rise 24.2% in 2022: Sumitomo Metal Mining
(Tekko Shimbun, March 29)
Anglo-Mitsubishi copper mine to build desalination plant in Chile
(Bloomberg, March 29)
TAKEAWAY: Chile’s copper miners have commissioned seven desalination projects so far, many delayed as COVID slowed plant construction. The Chilean government is also promoting hydrogen-fueled equipment at mine sites.
Truck diesel consumption trends up
(Japan NRG, March 30)

JERA says establishing Singapore unit to maximize global LNG portfolio value
(Company Statement, April 1)
BY MASUTOMO TAKEHIRO
Limited Options Tie Japanese Government’s Hands
Dealing with Looming Oil Shock
Soaring LNG and crude oil prices, accelerated by Russia’s war with Ukraine, are starting to reverberate throughout the economy, inflicting a high toll on Japanese households and nearly all areas of commerce and industry. Some experts already refer to this situation as the Third Oil Shock, with the first such global energy shock having taken place in 1973, almost half a century ago.
So far, state subsidies have been the main measure to combat energy-driven inflation. Last week Prime Minister Kishida ordered yet more of the same in an effort to shield consumers and seniors, in particular, from higher food bills. But it’s increasingly clear that this won’t be enough and bolder steps will be needed in the coming months, likely tying up more of the national budget, weakening the yen, and likely delaying the energy transition.
Unlike the 1970s, Japan’s government, as well as those of its western allies, are more experienced and in a better position to tackle the negative fallout from rapidly rising energy prices. However, many of the tools available to the state and the monetary authorities in Japan are already deployed or even tapped out after three years of dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic as well as long-term structural issues.
With only three months or so before upper house election the premier will be walking a political and economic tightrope. Deft handling of the energy dilemma could help Kishida’s administration secure a strong political platform for years. How much control the government can exercise over energy markets will be severally tested in the next three to four months.
It all starts with a full tank
Nationwide, retail gasoline prices have risen to a 13-year high. Without existing countermeasures, the price would have surpassed the record high of ¥185/ liter reached in 2008. Some experts even foresee the price going beyond ¥200.
If crude oil prices remain at an average of ¥120/ barrel, the burden on households will grow by about ¥44,000 this year and the same next year, according to estimates. Inevitably, this would lead directly to a painful dip in disposable income. Additionally, the cost for kerosene purchases in cold weather regions will be of particular concern from about October this year.
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for February indicates that gasoline, as well as electricity, and gas prices rose 22.2%, 19.7%, and 22.9%, respectively, the steepest YoY increase for energy in 41 years.
Soaring fuel costs are putting pressure on agriculture and fisheries, which use heavy oil for fuel, and the transportation and cleaning industries are also said to be hit hard.
Power utilities are having a rough time, in part due to the fact that it takes three to five months to pass on rising fuel costs to electricity bills. To make matters worse, in order to protect consumers there’s a system in place that prevents an upward adjustment if the average fuel price exceeds 1.5 times over a certain base price. Indeed, Hokuriku Electric faced this upper limit for February, and four more utilities are heading for the same for March.
Already in the 3Q of 2021, all of the major power companies, except for Kyushu Electric, saw a YoY decline of 30-80% in income, pushing four of the 10 into the red. Six of the companies, including TEPCO and Chubu Electric, are expected to post losses for the fiscal year that ended in March.
Subsidies vs tax cuts
PM Kishida, who appears to favor the pork-barrel approach, last week instructed government to start work on a new stimulus package, rumored to be as large as ¥2 trillion, ready for late April. That will aim to combat high oil prices and shield households from rising food prices, while also supporting SMEs.
Until the new stimulus arrives, Kishida will hope to placate public ire mainly by subsidizing gasoline. Since January, the government has been subsidizing the portion of the pump price above ¥172/ liter, sending funds to oil wholesalers to compensating for their rising costs.
The subsidy cap was initially set at ¥5/ liter, but raised to ¥25 on March 4 after the Russian incursion into Ukraine. To implement this policy from January to March, ¥430 billion ($3.5 billion) was appropriated from the FY2021 budget reserve.
This measure was supposed to be time-limited until the end of March, but the government has decided to extend it to the end of April as chaotic scenes around gas stations could emerge if it was suddenly discontinued.
Further subsidies are more targeted to industry and seek to cool prices for kerosene, diesel, and fuel oil.
There are other policy tools PM Kishida could deploy. One is a so-called “trigger clause” introduced when the current opposition parties were in power over a decade ago. This option temporarily lowers a type of tax on gasoline.
Gasoline is subject to a “gasoline tax” of ¥53.8/ liter, as well as a “petroleum and coal tax” of ¥2.8/ liter. A 10% consumption tax is applied at the moment of sale. Originally, the gasoline tax rate was fixed at ¥28.7/ liter, but in the 1970s an additional ¥25.1/ liter was added to finance road construction. Today, this additional portion serves as a general revenue source.
What a “trigger clause” does is reduce the overall gasoline price by halting this additional ¥25.1 tax when the price of gasoline exceeds ¥160/ liter for three consecutive months. The trigger clause was frozen following the 2011 Japan Earthquake to secure financial resources for reconstruction.
On March 4, when asked about measures to be taken after April, Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno Hirokazu, admitted: “The government will consider all options, including the trigger clause”.
Lifting the freeze requires new legislation, which is why this method is politically charged. Introducing a trigger clause would lower tax revenue by ¥130 billion per month. Supposing it’s in effect for 12 months, then the missed revenue would amount to ¥1.6 trillion. Since the gasoline tax is inclusive of a local gasoline tax portion, this option would also hurt local municipality budgets.
Additional efforts
In addition to the demand-side measures, the government has been active in trying to raise supply. In response to a request from the U.S., Japan has been releasing oil reserves. At the end of 2021, Japan’s national stockpile had 146 days’ worth of domestic demand. The Oil Stockpiling Act does not permit the sale of oil for price suppression measures, but the government got around this by claiming that the main purpose is replacement of the liquid in the tanks.
The three-stage release is due to total about 660,000 kiloliters. The sale of 100,000 kiloliters (630,000 barrels) of oil in February and a further 260,000 kiloliters in March were done via public tenders. The remaining 300,000 kiloliters is approved for distribution after May 20 in the third and final round of tenders.
Diplomatic efforts are also in play. On March 15, Kishida spoke with the UAE’s Crown Prince Muhammad and confirmed that the two sides will work together to stabilize the oil market. Shortly thereafter, Foreign Minister Hayashi visited the UAE.
Japan’s top three banks are also part of a western consortium that recently agreed to loan $1 billion to Kuwait Petroleum Corp. to help it expand output.
In the meantime, the oil shock is replacing another one related to nuclear energy. Potentially for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the majority of respondents to a survey by a national newspaper said they favor the restart of more nuclear reactors in the country. The Nikkei survey from late March had 53% of people calling for restarts. (For more on Japan’s nuclear debates, see the March 14 edition)
There are also national efforts around energy efficiency and conservation.
Conclusion
If history is any indication, the Japanese economy, along with the entire global economy, could well be entering a period of recession and accompanying difficulties. The year after the 1973 Oil Crisis, for example, Japan posted negative growth for the first time in the postwar era – an 8.2% plunge in GDP growth over 12 months.
Precisely because of that past experience, however, Japan and allied governments are more able and knowledgeable when it comes to mitigating the impact of an impending energy crisis. The economic fallout after the Lehman Shock, for example, was staggered over two years and saw a 7% drop in GDP growth over 24 months.
The biggest problems for PM Kishida will be the events that he cannot control and sudden supply shocks. With President Putin determined to strike back against Western sanctions, the chance of both of those occurring are not small.
BY JOHN VAROLI
Putin’s Rubles-for-Gas Threat:
Desperate Measure or Start of Bigger Changes?
The global energy community was initially bewildered by Moscow’s threats last week demanding ruble payment for energy sales. Russian President Vladimir Putin set an April 1 deadline for the measure, which left some wondering whether it was a mischievous geopolitical prank. That certainly wasn’t the case.
The threat was real and aimed at “unfriendly nations” which includes Japan, the U.S., Australia, Canada, Britain, New Zealand, South Korea, and all EU member states. With Europe’s economy dependent on Russia for about 40% of gas imports and 25% of oil, EU leaders began to prepare for possible disruption of energy supplies that would have had catastrophic consequences.
Germany’s finance minister was the first to reject the notion, saying that energy contracts can’t be altered. Other EU countries quickly followed suit. Since Russian energy exports to Japan are much smaller, METI Minister Hagiuda waited a few days before telling the G7 that Japan won’t accept Russia unilaterally changing contract terms between private companies.
The political standoff will not surface in energy flows just yet since commodities already paid for will be delivered as agreed, according to Russia. But from the middle of April, the impact will start to be seen. With the ruble’s recent rebound, President Putin is seeking to build on his gambit to subvert the dollar-bound commodity world order. For the Kremlin, ruble-priced gas is just the beginning.
Brief history of recent events
First, some background. For eight years, Russia and the West have stared each other down over control of Ukraine, Europe’s largest country after Russia. In the early 2010s, Ukraine’s government negotiated a political and free trade agreement with the EU, but in late 2013 then President Viktor Yanukovich made a sudden decision to walk away from the deal. This sparked protests, which turned violent and resulted in deadly clashes with the police. By early 2014, Yanukovich fled from Ukraine to Russia and a new government was formed.
Russia called the ousting of Yanukovich an illegal coup. The U.S. backed the insurrection, which brought to power a pro-western group. Ethnic Russian separatists living in the heavily-industrialized eastern Ukraine region of Donbas, however, vowed not to support the new government and formed a militia. The new Ukrainian regime engaged in a military campaign against the separatists.
Moscow responded by sending unmarked troops into Crimea and annexing the predominantly ethnic Russian region. It also sent forces to help the pro-Russian Donbas militia. The latter’s standoff with the Ukrainian military ground to a stalemate after six months. The annexation of Crimea sparked a wave of sanctions, though Japan’s measures against Russia were relatively mild as then Prime Minister Abe sought to improve Russo-Japanese relations. Western countries also helped to arm and train Ukraine’s military.
Fast forward to Feb. 24, 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, claiming it was a preemptive strike to outwit an alleged planned Ukrainian offensive against the besieged Donbas region. (Kiev and NATO deny these charges). On Feb. 26, western allies announced far-reaching sanctions against Russia, the most wide-reaching of which was freezing the country’s $640 billion in foreign-exchange reserves.
That sent the ruble plunging from 84 rubles to almost 135 rubles per dollar in early March. White House officials claimed that they had devastated the Russian economy and reduced the ruble “to rubble”.
Faced with this humiliation, the Kremlin sought to shore up domestic reserves and stabilize the economy. Russia’s Central Bank raised interest rates to 20% and enacted capital controls on exchanging rubles for dollars or euros. Until at least the end of June, the ruble is backed by gold (at a fixed 5,000 rubles per gram).
After the initial wobble, Putin decided to go on the offensive, unleashing a broadside against the U.S. dollar’s dominance in global trade. Leveraging Europe’s dependence on energy imports to its advantage, Putin demanded that all “unfriendly” countries pay Gazprom, the state-controlled gas giant, in rubles. The Kremlin has signaled that a similar move to rubles will follow for other commodities that Russia exports.
How will rubles-for-gas work?
Except for the UK, where Gazprombank faces sanctions, energy companies can continue to buy Russian gas and oil in euros, according to Paul Goncharoff, an American business consultant based in Moscow. The only change is that foreign gas buyers will need to set up a ruble account in Gazprombank and link it to their euro account. Then, they’ll have to instruct Gazprombank to transfer the euro payment to their new ruble account.
“Russian banks have been sanctioned from the western banking and payment system, rendering it unusable,” said Mr. Goncharoff. “Russia will honor its supply contracts, receiving from the buyers the same USD or Euro sums due, but converted and paid in rubles. Now buyers can use the same payment paths that a host of countries like India, China, and others successfully have done and do.”
As existing contracts run down, western buyers may be asked to pay directly in rubles for future supplies. In theory, this could still be accommodated if a middleman firm registered in a neutral, “Russia-friendly” or even offshore jurisdiction was set up to bridge the currency issue. While such a scheme would be open to many weaknesses, not least of which is currency risk, it could also keep the flow of gas intact, albeit at a higher price.
Russia’s government would like to present the situation as not just a sanctions workaround, but the start of a new world order in international trade. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — will try to create their own economic order, and that the demand for rubles is meant “to protect Russian interests”, but “not a change in the terms of energy contracts.”
India has already declared that it has and will continue to buy Russian commodities as this is a matter of energy security. Russia has reportedly offered India oil at a discount to global market prices.
Furthermore, Russia is talking with its allies to create a new “basket of commodities” to partially, or wholly back, the ruble.
“This probably would include oil, gas, gold, and grains in a formula based on monthly settlement prices on globally recognized exchanges,” said Mr. Goncharoff. “It may well turn out to be quite advantageous to conduct business in rubles, a hard asset-backed currency. Time will tell.”
Russia’s offensive on the U.S. dollar has sympathies in some non-Western countries. The IMF and Goldman Sachs have also warned that U.S. sanctions are damaging the dollar’s leading position because many countries now see Washington as weaponizing the American currency far too often.
Meanwhile, the ruble has bounced back from its initial post-invasion collapse. As of April 3, it was at 83.5 to the USD, close to levels before Russia’s incursion into Ukraine. Putin’s battle to force a change in the payment currency for key commodities, initially rejected by the G7, is far from over.
BY JOHN VAROLI
Below are some of last week’s most important international energy developments monitored by the Japan NRG team because of their potential to impact energy supply and demand, as well as prices. We see the following as relevant to Japanese and international energy investors.
Chile/ Solar power
Atlas Renewable Energy switched on its new 244 MW solar farm, now one of the country’s largest. Spread over 479 hectares, the plant will generate 714 GWh annually. Chile plans to retire and/or convert half of its coal-fired power plants by 2025.
China/ Renewable energy
China Shenhua Energy Co. will spend about 40% of its annual capital expenditures on renewable energy by 2030, reaching peak GHG emissions by 2025 and carbon neutrality by 2060. Shenhua is a subsidiary of state-owned China Energy Investment Corp., the country’s biggest coal miner, but also the world’s second-biggest renewable power developer.
Germany/ Hydrogen power
E.ON and Australia’s Fortescue agreed to develop a hydrogen supply chain. Fortescue plans to produce and export green hydrogen to Germany to replace about one third of Russian gas imports. The plan requires $50 billion in investment to produce 5 million tons of hydrogen.
India/ Renewable energy
Steel giant ArcelorMittal will partner with Greenko Group to develop a 975 MW around-the-clock wind and solar project. Power from the $600 million project will go to the company’s JV, ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India, and will be fully operational by mid-2024.
Mexico/ Solar power
A $20 million roof-top solar power project will cover Mexico City’s massive outdoor market, La Central de Abasto. With about 18 MW of generating capacity, the project is a rare green initiative for the government of President Lopez Obrador, who prioritizes fossil fuel power generation.
Netherlands/ Fossil fuel financing
ING Group will stop financing new oil and gas projects, becoming the largest bank to commit to climate change measures. While ING won’t finance projects approved after Dec. 31, 2021, it will still fund energy firms. Also, ING plans a 50% increase in lending for renewable energy projects by 2025. In 2021, ING loaned €7.3 billion to renewable energy development.
Netherlands/ Wind power
The Netherlands will double offshore wind farm capacity to about 10 GW by 2030. The additional power will particularly help large industrial concerns, such as chemical and steel plants, switch to sustainable energy.
UK/ Renewables infrastructure
In the next 10 years, Shell UK will invest £20 to £25 billion in the British energy system; mostly to fund offshore wind, hydrogen energy, carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) and electric mobility. In related news, BP will spend £1 billion on EV infrastructure by 2030, building 300 kW and 150 kW ultra-fast charging points to provide EV drivers with a range of 100 miles in 10 minutes of charging.
UK/ Wind and solar power
The government proposed tripling solar panels and doubling onshore wind power by 2030. Solar would increase from its current capacity of 14 GW to 50 GW; offshore wind from 11 GW to 50 GW; and onshore wind from 15 GW to 30 GW. In related news, work began on the first phase of the 3.6 GW Dogger Bank Wind Farm owned by SSE Renewables, Equinor, and Eni. Also, Ørsted will sell, for £3 billion, its 50% stake in the 1.3 GW Hornsea 2 Offshore Wind Farm. The buyer is a group that includes AXA IM Alts and Crédit Agricole Assurances.
U.S./ LNG
A subsidiary of New Fortress Energy will scrap its proposed LNG plant in Pennsylvania due to an environmental group’s lawsuit seeking to terminate the company’s emissions permit. The $800 million plant was intended to liquify natural gas from the Marcellus Shale gas field.
U.S./ Wind power
The first wind energy lease sale for areas off the coast of North and South Carolina will be held in May. The Interior Department will offer two areas covering 110,000 acres in the Carolina Long Bay area that could generate as much as 1.3 GW of offshore wind energy.
BY ANDREW STATTER
The Great Energy Talent Squeeze
As Japan and the world transitions their energy mix from fossil fuels to renewables and new fuels, the workforce is transitioning as well.
With new sectors such as offshore wind and hydrogen growing quickly, companies need to hire more people than experienced professionals exist in the market. With highly competitive tender processes and immature markets, this creates the challenge of a market short in qualified candidates.
A clear example of this is seen in the nascent offshore wind industry, where multiple developers form a consortium, and multiple consortiums compete over the same project. While there’s only one eventual winner, all of them need to hire qualified talent to develop proposals. The challenge is compounded by the fact that Japan is going from <0.1GW to 10 GW of capacity by 2030, and the experienced talent pool is very thin. The same will be true for years to come.
As offshore wind developers grow and need more people, they are turning to other renewable sectors in the hunt for staff. Talent in onshore wind, solar power, as well as real estate and large Japanese trading firms is in high demand.
Many companies are putting emphasis on transferable skills, coupled with a flexible mindset. This is great news for professionals from other sectors, who can leverage relevant experience to move into a high-growth market. Skills in particularly high demand are project management, negotiation with local stakeholders (landowners, local business, fisheries, municipal governments etc.) commercial negotiations, and financial acumen.
With the right motivation and attitude, as well as support from the employer, members of the workforce can catch up quickly and learn new industry specifics.
The PV market is in transition, and has plenty of talent experienced in local stakeholder management. As the oil & gas industry plateaus, we will see more talent adept at complex commercial negotiations, supply chain management and contract work transition into the renewables sector.
The energy transition demands flexibility from the government, incumbent companies and the grid. Companies driving the transition need to show the same flexibility in hiring in what is currently a developing market.
About the author
Andrew Statter is Partner and Head of GreenTech at Titan GreenTech, a Tokyo-based human capital and executive search firm with a focus on renewable energy and clean technology markets. Titan supports global companies with Japan market entry, as well as scale-up and key hiring.
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NEWS
・Govt. sets out policies to move away from Russian commodities including natural gas and metals through a multiprong strategy
・Majority of Japanese now support nuclear reactor restarts, a survey by top business daily finds in first such result since 2011
・Japan’s top three banks to stop financing the mining of coal for power generation, lowering exposure to the sector over time