
Sept. 26, 2022
NEWS
TOP
ENERGY TRANSITION & POLICY
ELECTRICITY MARKETS
OIL, GAS & MINING
ANALYSIS
TOP INTERVIEW
JERA’S DECARBONIZATION STRATEGY CHIEF
Japan’s top power utility and LNG importer, JERA, has embarked on an ambitious strategy to shift its power plants to burn ammonia and potentially hydrogen. This has already led the company to announce the world’s biggest tender for ammonia supply. Japan NRG sat down with Takahashi Kenji, GM of the Decarbonization Promotion Section at JERA’s Corporate Strategy Dept. to discuss how the ammonia tender is going and the company’s plans to move away from coal. We also talked about the future of CCS, JERA’s outlook for Southeast Asia, and how the company sees “carbon neutral” LNG.
WAS JAPAN’S POWER MARKET DEREGULATION A FAILURE? NEW ENTRANTS FACE FIGHT TO SURVIVE
Japan’s retail electricity market may be facing its greatest crisis since the end of World War II. Rapidly rising energy prices have forced many electricity retailers into bankruptcy or market exit. At the center of this upheaval are companies that sprung up since 2016, the Power Producer and Suppliers (PPSs). These companies came in to challenge the regional utilities, betting that deregulation and a shift to cheaper or renewable power sources would ease the incumbents’ grip on the market. This strategy worked for years but has come unstuck in the last 12 months. How many of the PPS will be able to survive this challenging time? We review the prospects.
GLOBAL VIEW
UN and IRENA outline scale of renewable investment needed by 2030, but UN also tweaks net-zero outlook to allow some coal projects. Germany nationalizes gas importer Uniper. China purchases of Russian oil hits records. Fracking under pressure in Australia. Details on these and more in our global wrap.
EVENTS SCHEDULE
PUBLISHER
K. K. Yuri Group
Editorial Team
Yuriy Humber (Editor-in-Chief)
John Varoli (Senior Editor, Americas)
Mayumi Watanabe (Japan)
Yoshihisa Ohno (Japan)
Wilfried Goossens (Events, global)
Regular Contributors
Chisaki Watanabe (Japan)
Takehiro Masutomo (Japan)
Art & Design
22 Graphics Inc.
Events


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OFTEN USED ACRONYMS
METI The Ministry of Energy, Trade and Industry
MOE Ministry of Environment
ANRE Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
NEDO New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
KEPCO Kansai Electric Power Company
EPCO Electric Power Company
JCC Japan Crude Cocktail
JKM Japan Korea Market, the Platt’s LNG benchmark
CCUS Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage
mmbtu Million British Thermal Units
mb/d Million barrels per day
mtoe Million Tons of Oil Equivalent
kWh Kilowatt hours (electricity generation volume)

“Green food” financing starts as govt decides to double biomass-derived energy
(Japan NRG, Sept. 15)
Major biomass materials
|
|
Annual supply |
Reuse rate |
2030 target rate |
|
Livestock manure |
80 million tons |
86% |
90% |
|
Sewer waste |
79 million tons |
75% |
85% |
|
Paper |
85 million tons |
80% |
85% |
|
Food waste |
24 million tons |
58% |
63% |
|
Crop waste |
12 million tons |
31% |
45% |
|
Forest waste |
9.7 million tons |
29% |
Over 33% |
|
Scrap wood |
5.5 million tons |
96% |
96% |
TAKEAWAY: Japan’s biomass supplies could increase as the country’s reuse rate of agricultural waste is 92% and wood scrap 29%. However, obtaining the proper balance between energy and food security requirements will be challenging since biomass demand will outstrip supply.
MAFF has oversight over biomass production, but METI has authority to determine which biomass materials can be used as fuel.
METI’s standard is that inedible material could be fuel, but it’s not so simple. Farms reuse some inedible material for livestock feed or fertilizer. The present METI system does not allow farms to take part in energy policy discussions, which vexes the farming sector.
Biomass market is estimated at ¥500 billion.
See also “Once Trash, Used Cooking Oil Now Center of Tug-of-War Between Food and Jet Fuel” —in the May 23, 2022 issue of Japan NRG.
Government-private sector council on e-fuel launched
(Government statement, Sept. 16)
TAKEAWAY: So far, the production cost of e-fuel is ¥300-700/ liter. Bioethanol is positioned as a near-term transition fuel until e-fuel commercialization. Bioethanol import costs are one-third of e-fuel costs. See also the analysis “Toyota Has Not Given Up on Gasoline: Automaker Plans to Develop Green Gasoline” in the Sept. 5, 2022 issue of Japan NRG. Nissan Motor has also been developing biofuel cell vehicles.
METI, JFTC clarify electricity rate rule in power trade guidelines
(Government statement, Sept. 20)
TAKEAWAY: Overcharging users is typically a consumer issue but becomes a competition issue if the conduct is considered to be an “abuse of superior position” as banned by the Antimonopoly Act. The guidelines might be updated again to ensure competition law compliance in B2B deals as more multi-party demand-response, aggregation and virtual power plants enter the market.
Government publishes human rights due diligence guidelines
(Government statement, Sept. 14)
TAKEAWAY: The guidelines apply to B2B activity, meaning Japanese investments into Russian energy projects possibly aren’t covered since the deals involve the state, according to a business lawyer.
(Government statement, Sept. 13)
Airport begins using locally-made green fuel
(Business Insider, Sept. 21)
Idemitsu to receive subsidies for 250 MW Australian pumped hydro project
(The Chemical Daily, Sept. 21)
Japanese automakers to pay Avanci connected-car technology fees
(Avanci statement, Sept. 21)
TAKEAWAY: Avanci licenses don’t include wireless power transmission technologies for EV charging stations. Also, Samsung and Huawei are among the telecom technology giants that are not part of Avanci as they have their own licensing policies.
Automakers paying for patents required for telematic control units reduces the cost burden on unit manufacturers. In the past, component suppliers were expected to pay all license fees. Automakers will pass on the increase for licenses and raw materials; the license cost is negligible compared to battery costs.
Japan to test wireless charging for EVs on roads
(Asia Nikkei, Sept. 20)
METI pledges to start design of test reactor for sodium-cooled fast reactor in 2024
(Denki Shimbun, Sept. 14)
TAKEAWAY: Fast-reactor technology is at the center of Japan’s national nuclear policy because it’s considered the best solution not only for power supply, but also for radioactive waste. However, since the technical issues at the Monju prototype fast breeder reactor in 1995, the technology has been out of favor. The government decided to decommission Monju in late 2016. The fate of Japan’s sodium-cooled fast reactor may depend on the success of the U.S. startup TerraPower’s collaboration with JAEA and MHI.
Japan to work on nuclear fusion strategy
(Denki Shimbun, Sept.14)
Kansai Electric to develop CCS technology for JOGMEC
(Denki Shimbun, Sept. 20)
NEDO, RITE and MHI Engineering developed DAC test facility
(Denki Shimbun, Sept. 21)
Mitsui enters green hydrogen, ammonia markets in Australia
(Company Statement, Sept. 16)
Australian ammonia to be exported to Japan
(Denki Shimbun, Sept. 16)
JNFL approves new design of planned MOX fuel plant
(Denki Shimbun, Sept. 16)
TAKEAWAY: MOX fuel would be used at NPPs such as units 3 and 4 of Takahama NPP (Kansai Electric), unit 3 of Ikata NPP (Shikoku Electric), or unit 3 of Genkai NPP (Kyushu Electric). J-Power’s Ohma NPP (under construction) plans to use 100% MOX fuel.
METI to reconsider “40-years rule” for nuclear reactors
(Sankei Shimbun, Sept. 22)
TAKEAWAY: In the U.S., reactors can operate for up to 80 years. In the UK, there’s no limit, but each unit is evaluated every 10 years. If Japanese reactors are to operate for a much shorter period than other countries, this gives a wrong impression about nuclear safety in the country. It would be a tacit admission that Japan’s nuclear equipment is unreliable.
This also comes at a time when public opinion is turning more positive on nuclear energy than it has been since the Fukushima disaster. The latest poll by the Nikkei, published on Sept. 19, showed 53% of the respondents support Kishida’s recent call to build next-generation reactors with only 38% against.
|
US |
No legally binding limit |
Six reactors have cleared regulatory reviews to run up to 80 years; 9 are under review |
|
UK |
No legally binding limit |
Safety reviews every 10 years |
|
France |
No legally binding limit |
Safety reviews every 10 years; 20 out of 56 reactors have been running for over 40 years |
|
Netherlands |
Plants’ operational periods written in law, but no limit |
Plans to extend reactor operating lives to beyond 60 years |
|
South Korea |
No legally binding limit |
Safety reviews every 10 years |
Source: METI
IEEJ report highlights decarbonization challenges
(Gas Energy News, Sept. 19)

TEPCO to hike corporate tariffs by up to 14%
(Nikkei, Sept. 20)
TAKEAWAY: The 10 major EPCOs have ¥5 trillion in cash, and reserves exceed ¥2 trillion. This makes their calls for raising electricity prices suspect in the eyes of many in the media as the perception remains that EPCOs must primarily serve a social role. The companies will argue that since deregulation they cannot be expected to both compete in an open market and act in the greater public good while suffering losses. PM Kishida and his government will be wary of pushing utilities to continue absorbing rising costs ahead of a crucial winter period. A compromise solution via subsidies to EPCOs to reign in power bills is likely.
Winter power supply to improve thanks to early plant restarts
(Government statement, Sept. 15)
Updated power reserve rates in % (previous forecast dated June 30)
|
|
January |
February |
|
Hokkaido |
7.9 (6.0) |
8.1 (6.1) |
|
Tohoku |
3.4 (1.5) |
4.1 (1.6) |
|
Tokyo |
3.4 (1.5) |
4.1 (1.6) |
|
Chubu |
4.8 (1.9) |
6.4 (3.4) |
|
Hokuriku |
4.8 (1.9) |
6.4 (3.4) |
|
Kansai |
4.8 (1.9) |
6.4 (3.4) |
|
Chugoku |
4.8 (1.9) |
6.4 (3.4) |
|
Shikoku |
4.8 (1.9) |
6.4 (3.4) |
|
Kyushu |
4.8 (1.9) |
6.4 (3.4) |
|
Okinawa |
33.1 (39.1) |
34.4 (40.8) |
TAKEAWAY: OCCTO’s figures show Japan could live through the coming winter but needs to come up with new approaches for 2023 and beyond.
Plant restarts were brought forward by curtailing the maintenance period or changing their schedules. Some experts warn that if this measure continues, risks of unplanned plant shutdowns will increase. Seeking third-party supplies would cost the grids ¥105 billion this winter.
Five thermal power plants to come online in 2023
(Government statement, Sept. 15)
|
Area |
Power station |
Capacity |
Commercial service launch |
|
Tokyo |
Anegasaki 1 |
647 MW |
February |
|
Anegasaki 2 |
647 MW |
April | |
|
Anegasaki 3 |
647 MW |
August | |
|
Anegasaki 4 |
650 MW |
June | |
|
Shikoku |
Saijo 1 |
400 MW |
June |
METI reports errors in figures estimating how much power capacity will retire
(Government statement, Sept. 15)
|
2016-2020 |
Corrected as |
Previous figure |
|
New capacity |
14.99 GW |
15.53 GW |
|
Decommissioned capacity |
16.72 GW |
16.55 GW |
|
2021-2030 | ||
|
New capacity |
14.31 GW |
14.44 GW |
|
Capacity to be decommissioned |
43.33 GW |
27.65 GW |
TAKEAWAY: A deliberate error or an honest mistake? That’s the question most are asking around this issue. Part of the issue here is that METI’s definitions are confusing. New capacity means all newly planned installations of grids and non-grid operators. Decommissioned capacities include only those of key regional grids that haven’t operated for 45 years.
METI provided a list of thermal power plants of the major grids as of September, which is not a full list as plants owned by manufacturers and other non-grid businesses, mostly coal plants, aren’t included.
Kyushu Electric struggled to avoid blackouts amid extreme weather
(Denki Shimbun, Sept. 16)
DMG Mori plans solar farm to lower emissions
(Nikkei, Sept. 20
Wind turbine startup raises ¥1.2 billion for revolutionary technology
(PR Times, Sept. 22)
Sumitomo Electric delivers energy storage system to Kawasaki Thailand
(NNA Asia, Sept. 23)

LPG, biogas, hydrogen and gasified coal as alternatives to LNG
(Japan NRG, Sept. 15)
INPEX to explore new domestic natural gas field in Japan
(Asia Nikkei, Sept. 22)
Sempra considers blue hydrogen exports from US to Japan
(Asia Nikkei, Sept. 20)
Toho Gas expands to Thailand
(Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, Sept. 23)
LNG stocks rise to 2.62 million tons
(Government data, Sept. 21)
Japan’s Aug LNG imports slip, coal, crude rise, LPG jumps
(Government data, Sept. 15)

Sojitz, JOGMEC invest $9mln in Lynas Rare Earths in Australia
(Company statement, Sept. 20)
TAKEAWAY: Lynas has one of the world’s largest deposits of neodymium used for low emission vehicles and wind power systems, as well as lanthanum for some all-solid-state battery types.
Marubeni invests in a promising metals exploration company in Alaska
(Company Statement, Sept.21)
Sexual assault behind ENEOS CEO’s sudden resignation
(Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 21)
BY MASUTOMO TAKEHIRO

TOP INTERVIEW: JERA’s Head of Decarbonization Strategy
Japan NRG sat down with Takahashi Kenji, GM of the Decarbonization Promotion Section at JERA’s Corporate Strategy Dept. to discuss what Japan’s biggest thermal power utility and top importer of LNG thinks about the development of ammonia / hydrogen and other energy issues.
WORLD’S TOP AMMONIA TENDER
You announced the world’s biggest global tender for ammonia — to provide 0.5 million tons a year. How was the response?
We asked about 30 companies to submit proposals. We received proposals from almost all of them. Actually, since we made the tender information public, we received interest from more than twice as many companies. In total, nearly 100 companies expressed interest. However, we will be closely examining their proposals to see how much they can realistically supply and at what price. We will then deepen our discussions in order to conclude a proper contract.
What’s your early impression of the prices offered?
We see that the price of the underlying raw material, for example in the case of blue ammonia it’s natural gas, will be affected by when supply actually starts. So, first we need to determine the conditions under which that gas will be supplied and the basis of its long-term price. It’s not a simple matter of evaluating the offers as high or low at this point.
AMMONIA PURCHASING PARTNERSHIP
JERA has partnered with two other Japanese utilities (Kyushu Electric and Chugoku Electric) for joint procurement of ammonia. What is the thinking behind that?
All three companies seek to utilize ammonia for co-firing at coal-fired power plants and need to establish an ammonia supply chain. So, we said we’ll consider the possibility of joint procurement in the future. Also, state support is very important in such initiatives. We believe that working with several other companies, we’ll have a better chance of winning government support. We started as the three of us, but we’d like to invite other interested utilities to join with us and expand the group.
What kind of government support do you seek?
The government is currently looking at concrete measures to support companies in this sector, with the Hydrogen Policy Subcommittee and the Fuel Ammonia Policy Subcommittee leading the discussions. With that in mind, we’ll ask for state support.
PROGRESS IN CO-FIRING
You’re testing ammonia co-firing at the Hekinan coal plant. Are you satisfied with progress so far? Any issues?
We initially planned to test 20% co-firing at the Hekinan Plant in FY2024. However, we want to accelerate the schedule. After discussions with our partner IHI, we agreed to move up the timeline by a year. We now believe we can start tests in the second half of FY2023.
JERA’S Hekinan Thermal Power Plant

Source: JERA
It seems as though the 20% co-firing level is very achievable. Is that right?
Yes, for 20% co-firing, we will install a burner that’s already been confirmed as able to achieve the same combustion as if we used only coal, and without increasing NOx [emissions]. Installing it at the station will build knowledge on how to control the technology as a whole.
What are the main challenges for JERA in moving towards widespread use of co-firing? Is it price, or the technical side, or supply chain logistics?
If we end up with a co-firing rate of only 20%, that will cut CO2 emissions only slightly. So, this is only a mid-way point. Our next big step is moving to more than 50% co-firing. With support from the Green Innovation Fund, we’re working with IHI and separately with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to develop a burner that can accommodate 50% and higher. If development goes smoothly, we’ll move to demonstration tests.
IHI has developed a third of the boilers used in Japan and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries the rest. So, if tests are successful, I believe we can adopt the technology at all domestic coal-fired plants.
When do you expect to hit 50%?
Under the current Green Innovation Fund scenario, a burner will be developed by 2024 and demonstration tests completed by 2028. Once the tests are done, we’d like to roll out ammonia power generation as soon as possible, so that by the first half of the 2030s the main fuel used at existing coal plants is ammonia.
So, the technological aspect of the project the biggest challenge?
That’s right. We can’t discuss prices in detail until the technology is fully developed.
Where will you introduce commercial scale co-firing first – in Japan, the U.S. or elsewhere?
I think Japan will be first.
AMMONIA OR HYDROGEN?
Does ammonia as a power fuel make more sense than hydrogen?
In the U.S., if existing gas pipelines were switched to hydrogen, there’s a possibility that this can be more efficient. The same can be true for Europe. For Japan, bringing hydrogen by pipeline is not an option. So, you need to look at the most suitable and cost-effective carrier that can travel via marine transport.
As a consumer, we’re neutral on the carrier and technology. But in terms of where we can cut CO2 emissions the most, ammonia is superior. Because if you want to deploy co-firing at coal power plants, you cannot use hydrogen.
And, after that, from a Japan standpoint, it’s about which hydrogen carrier has the lowest cost when shipped across the sea.
HOW TO PRICE AMMONIA
There are many global benchmarks for natural gas and oil. But ammonia does not yet have those common benchmarks. So, how do you begin to evaluate its price?
Unlike other hydrogen-related products, ammonia is widely sold as a feed for fertilizer. So there is a track record there to a certain extent, including with ammonia spot prices.
However, this time we’re talking about ammonia as a power fuel. That’s not the same as a short-term market that trade ammonia as a raw material. So, we need to study which mechanism is most suitable to create a stable supply chain and support consumption over a period of time.
Natural gas has become a global market. Ammonia is still mostly traded locally. Will it follow in the footsteps of natural gas?
Part of the global ammonia production goes into making urea and I don’t think the contract pricing of that segment will change much. But the 20 million tons or so of ammonia that trades on the open market is much more volatile, responding to the supply-demand balance. That makes it a global rather than a local market. However, we’re talking about very short-term transactions. Which is not what you need for fuel procurement, which needs to be structured globally and with long-term transactions.
FUTURE OF CCS
If we move to co-firing and eventually 100% ammonia generation, will there be any need for CCS? Can co-firing and CCS co-exist?
If we are talking about using co-firing and CCS in coal-fired power generation, then it’s one or the other. If both are used, it’s a waste of resources and equipment. The first thing to estimate is which is the cheaper option.
Furthermore, the cost of running 100% ammonia firing or, say, 50% will be different. Whichever is the cheaper route will likely win.
ASIA STRATEGY
Japan’s government is promoting its Asia Zero Emission Community initiative. Does JERA have any specific plans to deploy ammonia and related technologies in Asia?
We’re in dialog with various power companies in which JERA has invested. But this is not just about promoting hydrogen, it’s about finding the most rational way to get to carbon neutrality.
If we suddenly ask people to burn hydrogen, which is extremely expensive, they may disagree. We should start with what is possible. Japan and other Asian countries should work toward carbon neutrality while ensuring supply without energy shortages.
We’ve received many requests from Asian countries that want to test ammonia co-firing, and we’re now in conversation around that. We’re also working with JICA to study roadmaps for carbon neutral power generation in Indonesia, among other countries.
This year JERA invested in a power company in Vietnam. Last year, you also invested in Aboitiz Power in the Philippines. Is this a strategy to expand renewable energy in Southeast Asia?
Yes, it is. We are not only going to use hydrogen and ammonia. We’ll also renewables, as long as they are inexpensive. However, we do need to balance this. Without it, we may not be able to provide stable power supply. So, we need to do both.
I believe we need to start with low-carbon energy and then move to decarbonization. We can use LNG to complement renewables. We could also use ammonia for existing coal-fired power plants. For new facilities, we could combine renewables with high-efficiency thermal power plants that could switch to hydrogen in the future. This is a trend that’ll likely develop further.
Furthermore, if a country has the potential for carbon capture, it may be possible to cover CO2 emissions with CCS without going to the trouble of introducing hydrogen. Or, if biomass resources are large, CCS could be combined with biomass.
We’ll use our knowledge and experience to determine the best combination for each country. Hydrogen and ammonia are just two of the options.
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Japan saw more activists at this year’s AGMs pushing companies to stop using coal. You plan to move away from coal gradually. But what do you say to those who want an exit today?
I think stable energy supply is the first priority. Only after this we can talk about decarbonization and costs.
We can stop using coal and move to only natural gas, and then introduce renewables as much as possible. But, if at this point we have no way to adjust our energy supply, then we hit a ceiling. So, I think there is a certain limit to what can be done.
Say we exit coal today and cover the gap with natural gas. The moment this happens we’ll be in a very difficult position due to stability of supply and cost issues. We will be taken advantage of in that situation. So, we will use both gas and coal. However, we will naturally stop using inefficient coal-fired thermal plants, and pick high-efficiency thermal plants to reduce emissions. Coal-fired power is necessary to ensure stable energy supply, and also to maximize the use of low-carbon natural gas.
“CARBON NEUTRAL” LNG
There is a fairly new product called “carbon-neutral” LNG that’s being actively promoted by some Japanese energy companies. JERA has not entered this sector so far. Do you have a different outlook on this topic?
Yes, we are not going to use it. We believe credits based on Scope 1 emissions, which relates to direct emissions, should not be used to reduce [someone else’s] Scope 1 emissions. The first thing to do is to tackle Scope 1 emissions.
BY YOSHIHISA OHNO
Was Japan’s Power Market Regulation a Failure?
New Industry Entrants Face Their Toughest Survival Test Yet
Japan’s retail electricity market may be facing its greatest crisis since the end of World War II. Rapidly rising energy prices over the past six months have forced many electricity retailers into bankruptcy or to exit the market, leaving many customers scrambling to find other service providers.
At the center of this upheaval are companies that sprung up since 2016, the Power Producer and Suppliers (PPSs). These companies came in to challenge the regional utilities, betting that deregulation and a shift to cheaper or renewable power sources such as solar would ease the incumbents’ grip on the market.
As long as the power prices were trending down for most of the last six years, that premise held. As a result, hundreds of PPS firms took over nearly a quarter of Japanese power sales.
The recent jump in fossil fuel prices, however, has bucked the trend. PPS firms without their own power resources, along with their sophisticated business models or price-hedging capabilities, have crashed. Many are now losing money in a market that combines heightened price volatility with pockets of supply disruption.
Japan has 737 PPS firms registered today. As many as 70-80% of those active in the market are unlikely to survive the ongoing flux and uncertainty. This winter could precipitate industry consolidation.
Deregulation gave rise to the PPS
After the end of World War II, Japan’s power supply system was dominated by 10 regional power companies that were strictly regulated by the government. The utilities were vertically integrated, covering everything from fuel purchasing to generation, transmission and retail of electricity.
Hand-in-hand with the expansion of its heavy power machinery groups such as Toshiba, Hitachi or Mitsubishi, Japan was able to build a world-class electrical power system mostly using homegrown technology.
The 10 regional utilities focused entirely on stable supply. This resulted in Japanese firms boasting the lowest rate of power blackouts in the world. But this stability came at a cost. Japan’s electricity prices regularly clocked in at several levels of magnitude higher than in the U.S. and Europe.
As Japan’s bubble economy burst and domestic manufacturers could no longer compete on quality alone, cost of energy became a hot potato issue. Cue an August 1993 assessment by the predecessor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications that Japan’s electricity prices were too high compared with overseas markets and should be reduced.
Reform began in earnest in 1995 with an overhaul of the Electricity Business Act. This led to a change in the system of electricity rates, establishing the foundation for market price mechanisms. It also opened up the generation market to Independent Power producers (IPPs) and promised more deregulation via a detailed roadmap.
Deregulation Schedule as of 1995[1]
Power voltage classification follows that of Tokyo Electric Power ↑
At a Cabinet meeting of February 2014, it was officially decided to deregulate all electric power by April 2016.
Dependent on the high-voltage market
The official birth of the PPS system in Japan could be set as May 1999, when another revision to the Electricity Business Act recognized PPS as a new power supplier category.
This watershed moment forced regional power utilities to open up their transmission networks to new entrants. These tended to be entities related to major Japanese conglomerates and included Diamond Power (Mitsubishi Corporation), Summit Energy (Sumitomo Corporation), Ennet (Tokyo Gas, Osaka Gas, NTT Facilities), and Erex (Nittan Capital, Mitsui & Co.).
It also briefly saw the market entrance of major overseas developers. The notorious Enron Corp. planned to build four gas and coal thermal stations across Japan before its spectacular collapse in 2001.
New entrants gained a small share of the market for industrial / commercial users but failed to make headway beyond contracts with allied or related companies. Regional utilities zealously kept control of the market through their power over the grid.
The total deregulation of 2016 was meant to address this as it asked the regional utilities to split off their transmission businesses. In practice, most reorganized as holding companies, keeping generation and grid companies separate within the same group.
Still, the April 2016 deregulation of the retail market engendered a lot of hope. With it, hundreds of new firms applied for a license to retail electricity. Among these were oil and gas companies, communication companies, real estate companies, trading companies, financial companies, and even local authorities. Established overseas energy giants won a permit alongside entities that officially employ just a few staff or that operate in completely unrelated sectors.
This wave of entrants, often referred to in Japanese as shindenryoku or “new electricity firms”, often practiced an asset-lite model. Most of them owned no generation capacity and could undercut the major utilities through their lower cost base. The new PPS firms began to quickly capture market share. In the first year, from April 2016 to March 2017, a total of 2,953,663 contracts switched from regional power companies to PPS. The next fiscal year, switching totaled 3,270,771 and remained at a similar level for the next three years.
In essence, about 3 million contracts have switched power suppliers annually since full market deregulation in April 2016.
Curiously, while the full deregulation (i.e., access to households) was the trigger for the quick growth in PPS firms, more than half of the electricity they sold was in the form of high-voltage contracts – a market segment that opened as far back as March 2000.
The reality was that corporate clients were far more interested in hearing about new options than households. The latter tend to be reluctant to switch providers and more conservative, while businesses tend to be more price-responsive. And yet, most PPS firms lacked the capacity to supply enough electricity to extra high-voltage customers, making them reliant on the wholesale market for volume.
Bankruptcies looming
When deregulation began PPSs supplied only 5% of Japan’s total electricity, but by December 2020 their market share increased, reaching a high of 20%. After a short dip, the share grew again and hit a record 22.6% in August 2021.
Since then, the share has started to slide. The latest official data released is for March 2022, which says the market share of independent retailers (not connected with one of the 10 major power utilities) was 21.3%. By now, it’s notably less.
After Moscow’s late February invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent western economic sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector, Japan’s wholesale power prices have spiked sharply. A major earthquake and unexpected troubles at aging thermal stations have added to power market disruptions since then.
For many PPS that once offered cheap contracts to win market share, this is an unsustainable scenario. Buying volume on the market at current elevated prices has led to losses even at the electricity retail units of major Japanese energy companies.
Among those announcing bankruptcy earlier was Synergiapower, established by Tohoku Electric and Tokyo Gas. Veteran developer of solar power projects, West Holdings said it will halt its power retail operations due to difficulty in procuring supply. Also, the power trading unit of e-commerce giant Rakuten Group paused the process of taking on new customers.
Some PPS signed up clients to market-linked pricing – a winner in times of calm, but a burden during an energy crisis. Consumers were shocked to see their electricity bill jump five or ten times as a result.
In a few cases, some PPSs reportedly misled customers by promising not to change the electricity price, but failed to mention that fuel costs would be an additional cost item. From March to June 2022 nearly 300,000 subscribers switched back to their regional utility.
At this rate, about 70 to 80% of the PPSs might not survive the current period of price volatility. Those with strong engineering and technology backgrounds and deeper pockets are more likely to stay in the business.
Why are so many PPSs facing potential disaster? The answer could be as simple as the fact that their power model was too easy. Most PPSs in Japan don’t generate their own power or have any engineering capacity, leaving them with little resources or experience in resolving crises. The era of simply buying power on the wholesale market and reselling it at a premium to consumers is over.
What happens next
The main goal of power market deregulation, as stated by the government, was to increase competition and thus lower the electricity price. At present, with power prices rising, many PPSs are left confused and ill equipped to continue.
To adjust, some PPS are trying out new business models, such as offering price plans linked to the market price. This leaves them competing with the major utilities only based on the customer service experience, a thin platform to build on.
The knee-jerk reaction by regulators and politicians, as well as consumers, could see regional utilities win back some of the market share taken by PPS over the years. Meanwhile, METI bureaucrats will grow more cautious on deregulation and look at the troubles in European markets, such as the UK, as further justification.
Those PPS that wish to continue in the market will surely now look to invest in power generation or batteries, seeking to secure captive capacity, or ally with power firms that have such access. With the Japanese retail market still lacking digital billing and sophisticated analytical products, PPS could add value through embracing new value-added services.
The great contraction in PPS numbers will surely mark the start of a more complex and innovative phase for the sector. The era of buy-low-sell-high outfits is gone.
Wholesale Electricity Market Share Held by “New Power Retailers” (Non-EPCos)
Red: Total; Blue: Special High-Voltage; Yellow: High-Voltage; Low-Voltage
Source: METI
BY JOHN VAROLI
Below are some of last week’s most important international energy developments monitored by the Japan NRG team because of their potential to impact energy supply and demand, as well as prices. We see the following as relevant to Japanese and international energy investors.
Australia/ Fracking
Origin Energy’s retreat from a major fracking project in the Northern Territory has led to a loss of $90 million. Facing intense criticism from environmental groups, Orion sold its majority stake in the Beetaloo Basin shale gas project for $60 million.
Australia/ Net zero
Leading iron ore producer Fortescue Metals Group will spend about $6 billion by 2030 to reach net-zero targets. By converting vehicles to hydrogen fuel the company will reduce operating costs by $818 million a year. Total cost savings would reach $3 billion by 2030, with its net-zero investment recouping costs by 2034.
China/ Oil and gas imports
China spent a record-breaking $8.3 billion in August importing Russian oil products, gas, and coal, a 68% increase YoY. Chinese buyers have purchased a record-breaking $44 billion of Russian energy in the six months since Moscow’s forces invaded Ukraine.
Coal power
UN Secretary General António Guterres called again for holding “accountable fossil fuel companies and their enablers that continue to invest and underwrite carbon pollution.” But the Financial Times reports that the UN’s Race to Zero project has quietly made major changes, including ending a ban on support for new coal projects.
EU/ Energy crisis
European governments have earmarked almost €500 billion this year to protect citizens and companies from the economic impact of soaring gas and power prices, reports Bruegel, the Brussels-based think tank.
EU/ Green energy lawsuit
Greenpeace, Client Earth and the World Wildlife Fund filed lawsuits over the EU’s labelling of gas and nuclear as “green” energy regarding investment into climate-friendly projects. These NGOs claim that the “fake green” labels are incompatible with EU climate laws.
EU/ Hydrogen energy
About €5 billion was approved for hydrogen projects, with a further €7 billion more of investments expected from the private sector. The EU will support the research, deployment and construction of hydrogen infrastructure.
Germany/ Natural gas
Germany will nationalize gas importer Uniper, raising the rescue bill to €29 billion. The deal brings the total cash pumped into Germany’s three biggest importers of Russian gas to at least €40 billion. In related news, Berlin nationalized the German subsidiary of Russia’s Rosneft, putting three refineries into a trusteeship.
Renewable energy
By 2030, annual investments of $1 trillion in renewable power and $130 billion in hydrogen will be needed to combat climate change, says a report by IRENA, IEA and the UN. Every year the world needs to add four times the amount of renewable energy deployed in 2021.
Russia/ Natural gas
In late December, Gazprom plans to launch the giant East Siberian Kovykta field, crucial for plans to boost gas sales to China. The company also said its reserves replacement ratio will exceed 100% this year, suggesting it will add more reserves than it will use up.
UK/ Fossil fuels
High energy prices have boosted UK small-cap fossil fuel companies. Seven of the 10 top performing stocks on London’s junior Aim market are fossil fuel companies. Companies such as Union Jack Oil and Angus Energy are among the top performing stocks on Aim.
Ukraine/ Nuclear power
Russian forces fired a missile that just missed the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP in south Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region. This came after the UN warned that Ukrainian shelling of another nuclear power plant occupied by Russian troops also risks a serious incident.
A selection of domestic and international events we believe will have an impact on Japanese energy
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January |
OPEC quarterly meeting; JCCP Petroleum Conference – Tokyo; EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act activates; Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Trade Agreement that includes ASEAN countries, China and Japan activates; Indonesia to temporarily ban coal exports for one month; Regional bloc developments: Cambodia assumes presidency of ASEAN; Thailand assumes presidency of APEC; Germany assumes presidency of G7; France assumes presidency of EU; Indonesia assumes presidency of G20; and Senegal assumes presidency of African Union; Japan-U.S. two-plus-two meeting; Japan’s parliament convenes on Jan. 17 for 150 days; Prime Minister Kishida visits Australia (tentative) |
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February |
Chinese New Year (Jan. 31 to Feb. 6); Beijing Winter Olympics; South Korea joins RCEP trade agreement |
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March |
Renewable Energy Institute annual conference; Smart Energy Week – Tokyo; Japan Atomic Industrial Forum annual conference – Tokyo; World Hydrogen Summit – Netherlands; EU New strategy on international energy engagement published; End of 2021/22 Japanese Fiscal Year; South Korean presidential election |
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April |
Japan Energy Summit – Tokyo; MARPOL Convention on Emissions reductions for containerships and LNG carriers activates; Japan Feed-in-Premium system commences as Energy Resilience Act takes effect; Launch of Prime Section of Japan Stock Exchange with TFCD climate reporting requirement; Convention on Biological Diversity Conference for post-2020 biodiversity framework – China; Elections: French presidential election; Hungarian general election |
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May |
World Natural Gas Conference WCG2022 – South Korea; Elections: Australian general election; Philippines general and presidential elections |
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June |
Happo-Noshiro offshore wind project auction closes; Annual IEA Global Conference on Energy Efficiency – Denmark; UNEP Environment Day, Environment Ministers Meeting – Sweden; G7 meeting – Germany |
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July |
Japan to finalize economic security policies as part of natl. security strategy review; China connects to grid 2nd 200 MW SMR at Shidao Bay Nuclear Plant, Shandong; Czech Republic assumes presidency of EU; Elections: Japan’s Upper House Elections; Indian presidential election |
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August |
Japan: Africa (TICAD 8) Summit – Tunisia; Kenyan general election |
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September |
IPCC to release Assessment and Synthesis Report; Clean Energy Ministerial and the Mission Innovation Summit – Pittsburg, U.S.; Japan LNG Producer/Consumer Conference – Tokyo; IMF/World Bank annual meetings – Washington; Annual UN General Assembly meetings; METI to set safety standards for ammonia and hydrogen-fired power plants; End of 1H FY2022 Fiscal Year in Japan; Swedish general election |
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October |
EU Review of CO2 emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles published; Chinese Communist Party 20th quinquennial National Party Congress; G20 Meeting – Bali, Indonesia; Innovation for Cool Earth TCFD & Annual Forums – Tokyo; Elections: Okinawa gubernational election; Brazilian presidential election; |
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November |
COP27 – Egypt; U.S. mid-term elections; Soccer World Cup – Qatar; |
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December |
Germany to eliminate nuclear power from energy mix; Happo-Noshiro offshore wind project auction result released; Japan submits revised 2030 CO2 reduction goal following Glasgow’s COP26; Japan-Canada Annual Energy Forum (tentative); Tesla expected to achieve 1.3 million EV deliveries for full year 2022 |
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NEWS
・Winter power supply seen improving due to early unit restarts of nuclear and thermal capacity, but outlook beyond 2023 cloudy
・TEPCO to hike corporate tariffs by as much as a sixth as utilities seek to change electricity pricing model to reflect rising costs
・“Green food” financing scheme launches as the govt. decides to double down on biomass-derived energy raw materials