
ANALYSIS
ON THIN ICE: ENERGY COMPANIES REMAIN CAUTIOUS OVER TRUMP’S ALASKA LNG
THE POLITICS AND INCENTIVES TO SMOOTH SITING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
ASIA PACIFIC REVIEW
This column provides a brief overview of the region’s main energy events from the past week
NEWS
WIND POWER AND OTHER RENEWABLES
CARBON CAPTURE & SYNTHETIC FUELS
EVENTS
Aug 27-28 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation / Energy Ministerial Meeting @ Busan, South Korea
Sept 9-12 Gastech 2025, Milan
Sept 15-19 IAEA General Conference 2025
Sept 16-18 APAC Wind Energy Summit @ Melbourne, Australia
Sept 17-19 Smart Energy Week Autumn 2025 / EV-HV-FCV Expo / Green Factory Expo / H2 & FC Expo / PV Expo / Battery Japan / Smart Grid Expo / Wind Expo / CCUS Expo / Decarbonization Expo / Circular Economy Expo @ Makuhari Messe
PUBLISHER
K. K. Yuri Group
Editorial Team
Yuriy Humber (Chief Editor)
John Varoli (Senior Editor, Americas)
Kyoko Fukuda (Data, Events)
Magdalena Osumi (Renewables & Storage)
Filippo Pedretti (Thermal, CCS, Nuclear)
Tetsuji Tomita (Power Market, Hydrogen)
George Hoffman (Sales, Business Development)
Tim Young (Design)
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ESG bond issuance fell to ¥1.92 trillion
(Nikkei Asia, August 21)
EGC proposes revising regulations under revenue cap system
(Government statement, August 19)
TAKEAWAY: Rising power demand from new data centers and semiconductor plants is driving the need for major grid upgrades. Such projects require large, long-term investments by transmission operators, but under the revenue cap system, cost recovery starts only after operation, creating funding challenges during construction. Therefore, easing financing for large-scale grid projects is a key issue in the ongoing electricity system reform.
Japan and India to focus on chips, critical minerals, etc
(Nikkei, August 19)
Sumitomo seeks turnaround of nickel project in Madagascar
(Nikkei, August 18)
TAKWAWAY: Ambatovy is one of the few significant assets in the critical raw materials space fully or largely owned and operated by a Japanese company. Nickel and its byproducts from Ambatovy could supply key materials for Li-ion batteries, hydrogen storage, and renewables tech, essential for EV production, energy storage, and grid stabilization.
Sumitomo Heavy sells systems that produce biogas from wastewater
(Company statement, August 19)
Power grid nationwide remains stable amid heatwave
(Denki Shimbun, August 18)
Enechain will provide marketplace system for new JEPX trading platform
(Company statement, August 21)
Georgia Power receives first advanced natural gas combustion turbines
(Company statement, August 15)
Japan Power Solutions enhances electricity cost reduction support
(Company statement, August 20)
Toshiba ESS develops binary power generators using amine-CO2 cycle
(Company statement, August 20)
GRID develops priority power dispatch support system for Hokkaido Electric
(Company statement, August 21)
MoE announces results for hydrogen supply chain model
(Government statement, August 18)
Kansai Electric, etc launch environmental value management tests in hydrogen co-firing
(Company statement, August 19)
Mie Pref and others ink deal for Yokkaichi Complex
(Government statement, August 15)
MOL and Itochu agree on ammonia bunkering demos
(Company statement, August 19)
Mitsubishi Logistics to enter grid-scale BESS market and invest over ¥40 billion
(Nikkei, August 22)
TAKEAWAY: As with solar, the BESS market is attracting companies outside of the energy sector because they may have a strategic advance. In the case of Mitsubishi Logistics, it’s the availability of land at its warehouses that are already connected to the grid and therefore relatively easier and faster to develop. It will be interesting to see whether Mitsubishi Logistics and others in a similar position choose to operate the BESS themselves or outsource this to sector specialists.
OCCTO awards 47 projects in solar FIP bidding, oversubscription trend continues
(Organization statement, August 22)
TAKEAWAY: The results indicate that bidding at ¥0/ kWh has become increasingly standard, reflecting a recent trend in which companies leverage the scheme to secure grid access while using PPAs to generate revenue. Still, the number of companies bidding ¥0 was much lower compared to the previous round (announced June 20). This was the second straight case of oversubscription, following a period of undersubscription.
Company | Price (¥/ kWh) | Capacity (kW) |
Mitsubachi 101 | 0.00 | 1,99 |
Mitsubachi 101 | 0.00 | 1,999 |
Mitsubachi 101 | 0.00 | 650 |
GVSJ20 (Greenvolt Solar Japan) | 0.00 | 1,125 |
UNIVERGY | 0.00 | 750 |
GVSJ20 (Greenvolt Solar Japan) | 0.00 | 750 |
GVSJ20 (Greenvolt Solar Japan) | 0.00 | 625 |
Chiiki Denryoku (HEXA Renewables) | 0.00 | 350 |
Sonnenblume No. 4 Power Plant (Shizen Energy) | 3.90 | 19,904 |
Solar Field 13 | 4.00 | 1,999 |
Solar Field 13 | 4.00 | 1,999 |
Solar Field 13 | 4.00 | 1,800 |
Konbumori Solar | 4.26 | 12,000 |
Daiichi Solar Power Generation (Renova) | 4.97 | 1,132.2 |
ES Solar Power (Earthsolar) | 4.98 | 1,998 |
Solar Field 13 | 5.00 | 850 |
MIRARTH Energy Solutions | 5.00 | 1,100 |
MIRARTH Energy Solutions | 5.00 | 900 |
MIRARTH Energy Solutions | 5.00 | 500 |
Enblue | 5.30 | 1,990 |
Enblue | 5.30 | 875 |
Enblue | 5.30 | 750 |
Enblue | 5.30 | 500 |
Enblue | 5.30 | 400 |
Enblue | 5.30 | 375 |
J-RE-NET | 5.30 | 1,987 |
Solar Field 13 | 6.00 | 600 |
WAKO | 6.20 | 700 |
WAKO | 6.20 | 400 |
Daiwa House | 6.49 | 555.5 |
Sirius Solar Japan 55 (Trina Solar) | 6.50 | 19,950 |
Ichigo ECO Energy | 6.50 | 312.5 |
Solar Field 13 | 6.90 | 600 |
ES Solar Power Sakura (Earthsolar) | 6.99 | 500 |
Tomakomai TJD Solar | 7.36 | 13,000 |
Sirius Solar Japan 55 (Trina Solar) | 7.73 | 750 |
Sirius Solar Japan 55 (Trina Solar) | 7.73 | 500 |
ES Solar Power Sakura (Earthsolar) | 7.87 | 1,000 |
ES Solar Power Sakura (Earthsolar) | 7.88 | 999 |
KASolar | 7.89 | 1,990 |
KASolar | 7.89 | 1,990 |
KASolar | 7.89 | 1,990 |
KASolar | 7.89 | 1,990 |
KASolar | 7.89 | 1,990 |
KASolar | 7.89 | 1,990 |
KASolar | 7.89 | 1,700 |
Daiwa House | 7.89 | 1,725.7 |
TEPCO PG plans demo on remote island chain seeking 100% renewables supply
(Company statement, August 8)
TAKEAWAY: Since around 2020, the Tokyo Metro Govt has cooperated with TEPCO PG in transitioning from diesel power, aiming to reduce diesel emissions and for the remote island chain to be powered exclusively through solar power. Challenges remain, such as infrastructure limits, environmental protection, high costs and a lack of skilled personnel capable of installing and maintaining advanced energy systems. Given that small grids are vulnerable to fluctuations, and batteries can’t always cover low-sunlight periods, backup diesel is required. A hybrid approach using solar, storage, smart management, and selective diesel seems to be a more practical path toward low-emission power.
Panasonic and ENEOS to hold energy management demo
(Company statement, August 18)
Hulic seeks 20% stake in Canadian fund to expand renewables portfolio
(Company statement, August 13)
Osaka Gas announces 1 GW BESS goal by FY2030
(Nikkei, August 20)

Power X begins power aggregation service for solar farms with BESS
(Company statement, August 21)
TAKEAWAY: The initiative addresses Japan’s growing issue of power output curtailment, where solar generation exceeds daytime demand, especially in Kyushu. The system is expected to help improve profitability under the FIP system.
Sumitomo Heavy develops new deposition tech for PSCs
(Company statement, August 18)
Mitsubishi’s offshore wind plans take hit as construction giant Kajima withdraws
(Nikkei, Japan NRG, August 22)
TAKEAWAY: Mitsubishi’s offshore wind projects, originally planned with GE Vernova as turbine supplier, remain in limbo as the contracts were never finalized, leaving procurement unsecured. Kajima’s withdrawal adds further uncertainty. METI is now revising auction rules to allow sales linked to market prices, a shift that could ease financial strain and even enable Kajima’s return, which would effectively rescue Mitsubishi’s projects. But such support risks a backlash from competitors who lost earlier tenders. Since these projects were Japan’s first large-scale offshore wind bids, the govt will likely continue backing them as a pillar of its energy transition, especially given the risk of a domino effect: delays in Round 1 projects disrupt logistics, port use, and the wider supply chain, threatening subsequent offshore wind developments. Still, the support needs to come through soon to revive the sector.
TAKEAWAY: Cancellation highlights the mounting challenges facing the wind sector, where rising costs are putting heavy pressure on upcoming projects. Industry players increasingly call on METI for stronger support to keep planned developments on track.
Kitakyushu plans assembly and component production hub for floating offshore wind
(Nikkei, August 20)
ERE teams up with Norwegian firm to speed up offshore wind expansion
(Company statement, August 18)
Startup to harness seawater–freshwater power for stable renewable energy
(Nikkei, August 21)
JAPC to reinvestigate faults at Tsuruga Unit 2
(Denki Shimbun, August 22)
Saga Pref, Karatsu City reject nuclear waste grants over dispute
(Nikkei, August 20)
TAKEAWAY: The lack of leadership at the national govt level on this issue is a concern. For all the willingness of individual towns to host a nuclear waste storage facility, the ability of regional authorities to block it makes the years and the taxpayer money spent on the surveys likely a waste. Bureaucrats in Japan prefer a softly-softly approach to sensitive issues. However, should the storage site remain an open question into the 2030s, public appetite for new reactor construction will suffer.
Tohoku Electric to postpone safety upgrades at Higashidori NPP
(Company statement, August 18)
TEPCO to start radioactive sandbags removal from Fukushima
(Nikkei, August 22)
TAKEAWAY: TEPCO continues decommissioning. Dismantling empty water tanks moves forward, with the 12th tank set for removal by the end of August. Around 1,000 tanks remain on-site as treated water release will continue through 2051. Monitoring shows tritium levels remain within safety limits, but the lack of practical separation technologies underscores the need for innovation.
Mitsui-backed Mozambique LNG project could restart soon
(Nikkei, August 23)
TAKEAWAY: This project was one of the biggest LNG investments by Japanese players outside of the U.S. The uncertainty of its construction amid a tough political and safety environment underscores the difficulties of opening up new markets for Japan’s LNG buyers.
LNG stocks up from previous week, up YoY
(Government data, August 20)
July Oil/ Gas/ Coal trade statistics
(Government data, August 20)
Imports | Volume | YoY | Value (Yen) | YoY |
Crude oil | 11.5 million kiloliters | 11% | 749.1 billion | -18% |
LNG | 5.3 million tons | -6.3% | 448 billion | -16.8% |
Thermal coal | 9.7 million tons | 1.2% | 163.9 billion | -30.9% |
NEWS: CARBON CAPTURE & SYNTHETIC FUELS
Carbon credit trading prices rise post-holiday
(Denki Shimbun, August 20)
Sumitomo Chemical and JFE Engineering to test CO2 recovery at waste facility
(Company statement, August 20)
METI to survey CO2 emissions from power generation companies
(Government statement, August 22)
Tokyo Century enters forest credit market
(Denki Shimbun, August 21)
Toyo Engineering tapped for SAF production utilizing diverse feedstocks
(Company statement, August 21)
ANALYSIS
BY FILIPPO PEDRETTI
On Thin Ice: Energy Companies Remain Cautious over Trump’s Alaska LNG
Over the past six months, among the G7 countries, LNG has turned from an undesirable though grudgingly accepted fossil fuel to a crucial bargaining chip in trade negotiations with President Trump, who demands that Japan and other allies buy more of the super-chilled fuel.
With his unabashed fondness for fossil fuels, much unlike Biden’s administration, Trump thinks more LNG sales can help bridge the $69 billion trade deficit that the U.S. runs with Japan. Toward that goal, in June, companies such as JERA and Kyushu Electric saw the writing on the wall and were eager to announce long-term LNG deals with the U.S.
In addition to appeasing Trump, buying LNG from the U.S. brings other advantages, such as no resale restrictions to third parties. And such sales help Japan ease its dependence on LNG imports from Australia (40% of total imports), as well as Russia (10%), trade with which has been complicated due to sanctions.
Beyond boosting the U.S. LNG sales in general, Trump is keen to develop the country’s Arctic region, which he says is a new frontier to help cement America’s return to ‘greatness’. Key to these plans is the long-stalled Alaska LNG project, which calls for exporting natural gas from Alaska to Asia.
That project’s price tag is a hefty $44 billion, partly because it will require building a lengthy pipeline to carry the gas from northern Alaska to a port in the south, where it would be liquified and put on a vessel to Asia. Foreign support is seen as crucial for the project to go ahead both for offtake and financing reasons. Japan, already the top direct foreign investor in the U.S., is encouraged by the White House to play a leading role on the Alaska project.
Japanese companies, however, remain cautious – not convinced the vast required investment will pay off or that the project will meet the touted deadlines. There’s also the perennial threat of a change of administration – and with it, a change of stance on this project and the broader U.S. LNG export narrative.
The project
Alaska LNG’s proposed capacity is 20 Mtpa, which is equivalent to about 30% of Japan’s current annual LNG consumption. U.S. Glenfarne owns 75% of the project, and the Alaska Gasoline Development Corp (AGDC) holds the remaining 25% share.
The project entails transportation of natural gas from the north Arctic coast, southward via a 1,300 km pipeline to a liquefaction plant not far from Anchorage, where the gas will be processed and then shipped. If all goes as planned, gas could start flowing by late 2028, with the first exports to Asia starting in the early 2030’s.
Glenfarne and AGDC have the role of developing the infrastructure. It consists of the pipeline, the gas treatment plant on the North Slope, and the liquefaction/export facility. The gas should come from two long-established fields on the North Slope, called Prudhoe Bay and Point Thomson. They should supply around 3.5 billion cubic feet of gas per day. Both fields are already in production. Their operators include ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, BP, and Hilcorp, among others.
To spread out the investment burden, the U.S. is urging Asian allies – Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – to join the liquefaction project, tying their potential participation to
ongoing tariff negotiations. In March, Alaska governor Mike Dunleavy visited those countries, as well as Thailand, together with delegations from AGDC and Glenfarne Group.
Project location. Source: Alaska LNG
In June, Officials from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan attended a U.S. government briefing in Alaska that was led by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, and Governor Dunleavy.
Of that group, Taiwan has emerged as the most eager, with state-run CPC Corp inking a non-binding deal in March for a possible purchase of 6 Mtpa of LNG. Overall, Taiwan plans to increase its total share of U.S. LNG from 10% to 20–30% of national imports. LNG is replacing nuclear power in Taiwan, which shut down its last operating reactor in May.
South Korea, however, is cautious. In theory, Korea Gas Corp (KOGAS) should take the lead, but the company is struggling with high debt and would have to pass the new project costs onto consumers. A Korean think tank warned in April that Alaskan LNG is more expensive than Russian gas.
South Korea prefers a multilateral approach, acting in concert with Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam to reduce risks. Meanwhile, the U.S., including Alaska’s governor, is pressuring Korea to commit, with the carrot of tariff concessions. Finally, Thailand’s PTT announced a non-binding agreement in June to buy 2 Mtpa of LNG from the Alaska project for 20 years.
Japan’s stance
Japan remains noncommittal. While it sees Alaska LNG as a potential bargaining chip in talks, it’s also concerned about economic feasibility. Doubts over viability came from research institutes such as the METI-allied IEEJ. Others worry about the project’s future after Trump and whether it will be built and begin deliveries as promised.
A delay of several years could have major implications down the line if Japanese buyers suddenly need to find large volumes of LNG at short notice. It could cause a spike in spot market rates.
Potential Japanese investors in Alaska include the usual suspects: Inpex, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, JERA, JOGMEC, and the Japan Bank of International Cooperation. Mitsubishi President Nakanishi Katsuya has already remarked on the project’s complexity, citing the very long 1,300 km pipeline and an uncertain demand in Southeast Asia, to where most of the Alaskan volumes would probably go because demand in Japan is currently on a long-term downward trajectory.
On July 22, Trump announced plans for a joint venture with Japan to develop Alaska LNG, but there were no statements supporting this claim from Japanese businesses. In fact, trading firms like Itochu and Mitsubishi contradicted Trump, saying they’re either not involved or still only gathering information about the project.
JERA, Japan’s largest LNG buyer, showed interest but stated its desire for cost clarity. Chiyoda Corp expressed interest in conducting feasibility studies, but INPEX questioned the project’s profitability altogether, citing the long pipeline route and the scale of the liquefaction facilities.
Despite such tepid public responses, Alaska LNG operator Glenfarne says it secured buyers for half of the planned 20 Mtpa output, without providing details. If Glenfarne is counting the volumes from the non-binding deals with Taiwan and Thailand entities, then the numbers may work. But non-binding commitments do not typically win bank financing. And so, the Alaska side and Trump’s White House are desperate to secure some form of financing or offtake guarantees from Japan, hoping they will have a snowball effect on other Asian allies.
Trump card: distance
Despite all the obstacles, Alaska LNG holds one trump card – especially over the hitherto more favored U.S. projects in the Gulf Coast. It’s estimated to take about 7-10 days to deliver an LNG cargo by ship from Alaska to Japan. It takes at least double, and sometimes triple the time from the Gulf Coast due to the congested Panama Canal. Avoiding the Canal and taking the cargo south via the Cape of Good Hope is even lengthier.
For a country like Japan, which doesn’t have the resources to store LNG for more than a few weeks, the shorter route is an attractive proposition.
Origin | To Japan |
Western Australia | 7-8 |
Queensland (Gladstone) | 9 |
Sakhalin | 2–3 |
Alaska | 7-10 |
Canada (West Coast) | 10 |
China (Shanghai) | 8 |
South Korea (Incheon) | 7 |
India (Gujarat) | 9 |
Qatar | 12 |
Middle East (M.E.) | 12–16 |
US Gulf Coast (via Panama) | 22-30 |
US Gulf Coast (via Cape of Good Hope) | 35–40 |
Nigeria | 22 |
Malaysia | 3-5 |
The problem for Alaska’s backers is that Canada has just started delivering LNG from a brand new project – with Japanese investment – about 1,000 km further south. The LNG Canada facility, operated by Shell, is 15% equity backed by Mitsubishi Corp and 5% by Korea Gas Corp. The initial phase offers 14 Mtpa and Mitsubishi has already signaled an interest in expanding the plant.
Which brings us back to cost. Can the Alaska natural gas, which will feed into the LNG project, offer a competitive advance to other North American projects? Since the gas fields in the north of Alaska are already operational, sourcing the gas could be competitive. But taking the gas by pipeline over mountains and raging rivers will not be easy. Which is why prior attempts to draw Alaskan gas field owners such as Exxon, BP and ConocoPhillips into the grander LNG export project have failed.

The 2016 iteration of the Alaska LNG project – which had been considered by various parties for already several decades – involved Exxon, BP, ConocoPhillips, and state-owned Alaska Gasline Development Corp (AGDC) making initial cost estimates, only to find that the numbers would not work based on low oil prices and due to the huge CAPEX. A Wood MacKenzie analysis at the time said the Alaska LNG project ranked poorly in terms of competitiveness globally.
Since 2016, LNG is back in vogue and oil prices are up from mid $40s per barrel to low $60s. But is that enough?
Estimates of LNG shipping time
To bring investors to the table, Glenfarne plans to de-risk part of the project by working on the pipeline first before moving onto the LNG plant phase. Alaska officials estimate that the state will soon need more gas on its southern coast and without a pipeline they would need to import the fuel. Once the pipeline is completed, the thinking is that investors from Japan and South Korea could upgrade their commitments into binding ones.
The pipeline cost is estimated at $11 billion (a quarter of the total LNG project budget). Amid inflation concerns, Glenfarne CEO Adam Prestidge says efforts are made to control costs.
Glenfarne wants to start pipeline operations in 2028, about three years before the liquefaction plant would be operational. The piped gas would arrive in the city of Anchorage, which faces gas shortages. Prestidge claims the pipeline will bring in local revenues even before the LNG plant completion.
As the work begins, potentially as soon as from the end of this calendar year, Prestidge is also looking to investors beyond Asia. He has claimed that the UAE and other countries have indicated interest in this project.
Conclusion
Unlike Trump with his bully pulpit, Prime Minister Ishiba cannot compel Japanese firms to join a massive energy venture abroad, especially when the commercial upside remains uncertain. Corporate decisions will hinge on economics, not politics: feasibility studies will be the prime factors for Japanese companies. Unless… the Japanese government decides to extend financial support or guarantees to domestic firms.
Among previous examples is Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project. Trading house Mitsui made the final investment decision to buy equity in this development in September 2019, five years after Russia took control of the Crimea peninsula and incited international sanctions. With the Japanese firms reluctant to wade into hot legal waters, the Mitsui deal was made in concert with state-backed company JOGMEC Corp. The latter took the bigger stake and offered guarantees to Japanese banks who lent money to the project – money that JOGMEC had to repay in early 2024 after the U.S. government sanctioned the project.
Whether PM Ishiba can offer similar conditions for an Alaska LNG investment is a big question. The premier’s political support is shaky and influence waning, meanwhile the national debt of Japan is at record levels. There’s also the issue of uncertainties that lie beyond a Trump presidency to consider.
Optimists still see a path to a final investment decision. LNG demand in Asia is on the up. For now, the pressure from environmental groups, many of which contest the need for more LNG use, is lower than it has been in recent years. And a project that ties the interests of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to those of the U.S. would be expedient from a geopolitical perspective. But, someone has to pick the bill for all this. Who will that be?
ANALYSIS
BY ANDREW SMALL
The Politics and System of Incentives to Smooth the
Siting of Nuclear Power Plants
Perhaps the most fundamental issue faced by Japan’s nuclear power industry when seeking to build a new facility is a very straightforward one – Where to site it in a nation that’s almost 70% mountainous and riddled with geological fault lines?
From the point of view of science and engineering, the issue comes down to whether or not a potential site will guarantee the power plant’s safe operation under even the most extreme circumstances. From a political point of view, however, choosing a site becomes enormously challenging to manage due to the need for approval from local governments and powerful agricultural cooperatives.
Japan’s limited land space makes land acquisition for any major infrastructure project a considerable political challenge, involving many stakeholders. Given its complex post-war history and engineering challenges, nuclear power faces an even greater set of challenges, with opposition both at a local and national level that the Fukushima disaster only exacerbated.
These sensitivities have led Japan to avoid using the more controversial tactics often deployed for large infrastructure projects to force the sale of land, such as eminent domain. Instead of coercive measures, when it comes to nuclear power, the state has developed sophisticated compensation mechanisms based on strong financial incentives for towns that host nuclear power plants. How do these processes work and how much money is at stake?
Building local consent with a ‘carrot’
The most important tool by which the government, in conjunction with Japan’s major EPCOs, responded to siting challenges is a financial mechanism called dengen sanpou (電源三法・Three Power Source Development Laws). The system allocates an ‘invisible tax’ – a portion of consumer energy bills – to fund hefty subsidies to small, rural towns with low tax bases that host NPPs. These subsidies are used to fund substantial local infrastructure and public facilities.
While also applicable to hydropower and geothermal host communities, dengen sanpou subsidies play an outsized role in nuclear power development given the huge amounts on offer and the political sensitivity of nuclear power itself.
Although on a smaller scale than the main host community, municipal governments within a specified range surrounding the NPP are also eligible for subsidy payments. In June of this year, the government expanded the range of towns eligible for such payments from 10 to 30 km in order to end the previous source of contention of towns not receiving subsidies that were located within evacuation zones. The latter usually covers a 30 km radius around the NPP.
The system was developed in response to both the first Oil Shock of 1973, the economic damage of which brought energy independence to the forefront of national politics. In an effort spearheaded by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, the Diet eventually passed dengen sanpo to systematize host community benefits and strengthen incentives for negotiations with town councils, fishery cooperatives, or industrial associations in potential siting towns.
Massive capital
The subsidies provide host communities with massive injections of capital to spend on municipal functions, infrastructure, and education. According to ANRE, municipalities could receive over ¥183 billion ($1.24 billion) in subsidies per reactor over the asset’s lifespan. This is why these rural towns – usually with populations of just a few thousand people – boast impressive public facilities that, in any other context, would appear to be a developmental miracle.
An example of this outsized capital influx can be seen in Kashima Town, Shimane Prefecture, which hosts the Shimane NPP. The town, with a mostly older population of under 6,000, used the capital it received from approving the siting of a third reactor to build a massive sports complex for local residents, complete with baseball and soccer fields, an indoor pool, and a $35 million gymnasium. The entire facility is co-located with the Shimane NPP’s visitor center.
In Ooi Town, Fukui Prefecture, which hosts Ooi NPP, an ocean-side luxury hotel and spa sits on newly built reclaimed land, next to a multi-story family and children’s play center, and retail facilities. Located next door is a nuclear PR center equipped with amusement park-style attractions that teach about nuclear energy.
Such expensive infrastructure is typical of nuclear host communities and sticks out in depopulated rural areas. Without strong industry, outside investment, and tax bases, such infrastructure only becomes possible through the unique structure of dengen sanpo subsidies.
Once one reactor is built on the site, others usually follow. This makes sense from the NPP operator’s point of view, because most nuclear power plants have multiple reactors, making them more efficient to run and easier to maintain. But the stacking of several reactors on one site is also attractive for the local community.
Once towns go through the complicated process of siting the initial facility, there is much less additional community resistance and even stronger financial incentives to allow additional reactors. Each time, a new set of long-term subsidies is unlocked, helping to support the town and its newly built premium-level public infrastructure. As a result, all but one nuclear power plant in Japan added at least one reactor beyond initial construction, with some adding multiple, like Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP’s six.
The trend of stacking reactors on one site creates a tremendous degree of fiscal dependence on nuclear-related revenues for the host community. For Ooi Town in Fukui Prefecture, one of the few local governments that publishes details of its nuclear revenue, such income comprised over 64% of its FY2024 budget. This includes the direct subsidy payments, as well as fixed asset taxes, income taxes from employees at the plant, and other indirect revenue sources.
In an economic arrangement reminiscent of former coal mining communities in the U.S., most nuclear host communities – particularly those with smaller populations – exist as one-company towns. With lower motivation to attract more industries to the area, local economies become dominated by NPPs, their related operations, and subsidy-powered investment projects.
Conclusion
Moving forward, dengen sanpo and nationwide nuclear infrastructure will play an important role in the future of Japan’s energy sector. Despite the government’s recent extension of potential reactor operating licences to beyond 60 years, in the coming decade, many NPPs will reach their upper operating limits and require decommissioning or replacement.
There is, however, essentially no precedent for a complete decommissioning of all nuclear reactors in a fiscally dependent host community – except the mostly evacuated towns near Fukushima Daiichi – and whether payments would continue.
Subsidies and broader economic benefits seem highly likely to remain as the central driver in nuclear siting. As units built in the 1970s reach their maximum planned operating lifespan over the coming decade, the system and its role in nuclear siting will enter an unprecedented era. To ensure long-term fiscal and economic security, local governments hosting older reactors will be highly receptive to utilities building replacement or additional units.
What’s more, increasing depopulation and impending fiscal difficulties of rural authorities with declining tax bases will also increase the allure of potential nuclear revenues.
As the urgency to replace the aging nuclear fleet increases, the government will need to decide how to use the subsidy trump card. If nuclear host communities are allowed to receive subsidies indefinitely, will they be more supportive of projects to build “replacement” reactors on the sites where aging units are scheduled for decommissioning or less? Can Japan’s public purse even afford to retain subsidies at today’s levels, and should this spending be taken into account when estimating the total cost of nuclear power generation?
A solution for one town will be copied by another, and the first case of a utility seeking to build a new reactor to replace an aging unit is already at hand. Kansai Electric plans to add a modern reactor at the Mihama NPP location. The local mayor already signaled his backing. The question is: What was the cost of his support?
ASIA ENERGY REVIEW
BY JOHN VAROLI
A brief overview of the region’s main energy events from the past week
Australia / Renewable energy
The Australian Energy Market Operator predicted the National Electricity Market will see a steady rise in renewable energy generation capacity, reaching 229 TWh by 2035.
China / AI
While the U.S. leads in AI development, its aging power grid and fragmented infrastructure are obstacles. Meanwhile, China’s surplus power capacity, bolstered by innovative ultra-high voltage transmission lines, is powering its AI ambitions.
China / CO2 emissions
Clean-energy growth helped China’s CO2 emissions fall 1% YoY in H1 of 2025, continuing a declining trend that started in March 2024.
China / Hydrogen
A joint EU-China report features multiple EU-based companies with pilot hydrogen projects or technology licensing arrangements in China, despite geopolitical tensions. Ceres was singled out for its SOFC platform development.
India / Nuclear power
Top Indian energy firms are advocating for nuclear power to decarbonize, while cautioning that electricity from reactors needs to be affordable to substitute coal.
India / Weather forecasting
India is working to significantly improve the accuracy of its weather forecasting systems to meet the growing demands of its renewables power generation sector
Indonesia / Oil & Gas
The Indonesia Energy Corp inked an MoU with Aguila Energia, an affiliate of Rio de Janeiro–based investment firm Aguila Capital, to develop oil and gas assets in Brazil.
South Korea / Nuclear power
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power is in talks with Westinghouse to create a JV to develop nuclear energy in the U.S. Trump has pledged to quadruple nuclear energy capacity by 2050.
Taiwan / Nuclear power
A referendum this weekend on whether to restart the Maanshan nuclear plant, Taiwan’s last operational NPP, ended in failure due to low voter turnout. Hence, no restart will take place.
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